feat(ops): nightly DB backups with rotation (#26)
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This commit was merged in pull request #26.
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-02 16:27:57 +02:00
parent 59522a6e96
commit dc9d5fc301
4 changed files with 40 additions and 1 deletions
+3 -1
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@@ -29,7 +29,9 @@ reverse proxy.
mitigate (a third party reading the DB files) reduces to "someone with access to your
machine" — mitigate it at the layer that actually works:
- **Use full-disk or volume encryption** on the host (BitLocker/LUKS) — strongly recommended.
- **Encrypt backups** of the `pgdata` volume the same way.
- **Encrypt backups**: nightly `pg_dump` rotation runs via the compose `backup` service
into `./backups/` (git-ignored) — keep that directory on an encrypted disk and copy it
off-machine. Restore: `docker compose exec -T postgres psql -U inboxintel -d inboxintel < backups/<file>.sql`.
- Before any **multi-user** deployment, revisit per the multi-provider security design
(host admins must not be able to read members' mail — plaintext bodies break that promise).
2. **DB connection is not TLS** — Postgres is only reachable on the compose-internal network /