Files
Inboxintel/src/InboxIntel.Infrastructure/Security/SafeHttpGuard.cs
T
cesnimda 626a9f8454 fix(security): Phase 4 edge hardening + SSRF egress guard
Backend security fixes from the Phase 1 register / Phase 2 roadmap (PR1 + V-01):

- V-01 SSRF: new SafeHttpGuard validates outbound unsubscribe URLs (scheme allowlist
  + DNS-resolve-and-block private/loopback/link-local/ULA/metadata ranges), wired into
  UnsubscribeService; the "unsubscribe" HttpClient now disables auto-redirect so a
  validated external URL can't 3xx into an internal target. +33 unit tests.
- V-04: session cookie SecurePolicy=Always in non-dev (SameAsRequest in dev).
- V-06: UseExceptionHandler/ProblemDetails in prod; Cleanup/Unsubscribe no longer
  echo ex.Message to clients (logged server-side, generic message returned).
- V-08: ForwardedHeaders trusted only from configurable KnownNetworks (default private
  ranges) + ForwardLimit, instead of trusting any client. New ForwardedHeaders config.
- V-09: returnUrl validated with Url.IsLocalUrl (no open redirect via OAuth flow).
- V-10: SearchService clamps Page/PageSize (<=200); Analytics clamps take/days.
- V-11: baseline security headers (nosniff, X-Frame-Options DENY, Referrer-Policy,
  COOP) + HSTS in prod.
- V-13: /app/info discloses only devMode to anonymous callers unless dev mode is on.
- V-12: API container runs as non-root 'app' user (keys dir pre-owned).
- V-03: Postgres + API ports bound to 127.0.0.1; POSTGRES_PASSWORD now required (no
  weak default fallback).

API compatibility preserved (clamps not rejections; error-body shape changes only on
failure paths). No DB migrations. Build + all 33 unit tests green. V-15 (MailKit
NU1902) persists across versions and the SMTP path is default-off — tracked, not bumped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 00:15:04 +02:00

95 lines
4.1 KiB
C#

using System.Net;
using System.Net.Sockets;
namespace InboxIntel.Infrastructure.Security;
/// <summary>
/// Validates outbound request URLs before the server fetches them, to prevent
/// SSRF (V-01). Used by the unsubscribe processor (URLs come from attacker-authored
/// List-Unsubscribe headers) and intended for any future server-initiated fetch
/// (AI/breach providers). Enforces an http/https scheme allowlist and rejects hosts
/// that resolve to loopback / private / link-local / unique-local / multicast ranges
/// or the cloud metadata address. DNS is resolved and EVERY resolved address is
/// checked, defeating DNS-rebinding to an external name that points at an internal IP.
///
/// Pair this with an HttpClient configured with AllowAutoRedirect = false so a
/// permitted external URL cannot 3xx-redirect into an internal target post-validation.
/// </summary>
public static class SafeHttpGuard
{
/// <summary>
/// Throws <see cref="SsrfBlockedException"/> if the URL is unsafe to fetch.
/// Returns the validated absolute Uri otherwise.
/// </summary>
public static async Task<Uri> ValidateAsync(string? url, CancellationToken ct = default)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(url) || !Uri.TryCreate(url, UriKind.Absolute, out var uri))
throw new SsrfBlockedException("Unsubscribe target is not a valid absolute URL.");
if (uri.Scheme != Uri.UriSchemeHttp && uri.Scheme != Uri.UriSchemeHttps)
throw new SsrfBlockedException($"Disallowed URL scheme '{uri.Scheme}'.");
// Resolve the host; if it's already a literal IP, GetHostAddressesAsync returns it.
IPAddress[] addresses;
try
{
addresses = await Dns.GetHostAddressesAsync(uri.DnsSafeHost, ct);
}
catch (Exception ex) when (ex is SocketException or ArgumentException)
{
throw new SsrfBlockedException("Unsubscribe target host could not be resolved.");
}
if (addresses.Length == 0)
throw new SsrfBlockedException("Unsubscribe target host did not resolve to any address.");
foreach (var ip in addresses)
if (IsBlocked(ip))
throw new SsrfBlockedException($"Unsubscribe target resolves to a disallowed address ({ip}).");
return uri;
}
/// <summary>True if the address is in a range we must never fetch server-side.</summary>
public static bool IsBlocked(IPAddress ip)
{
if (IPAddress.IsLoopback(ip)) return true;
if (ip.AddressFamily == AddressFamily.InterNetwork)
{
var b = ip.GetAddressBytes(); // big-endian
// 0.0.0.0/8 (this host), 10/8, 100.64/10 (CGNAT), 127/8, 169.254/16 (link-local + metadata),
// 172.16/12, 192.0.0/24, 192.168/16, 255.255.255.255
if (b[0] == 0) return true;
if (b[0] == 10) return true;
if (b[0] == 100 && b[1] >= 64 && b[1] <= 127) return true;
if (b[0] == 127) return true;
if (b[0] == 169 && b[1] == 254) return true; // includes 169.254.169.254 metadata
if (b[0] == 172 && b[1] >= 16 && b[1] <= 31) return true;
if (b[0] == 192 && b[1] == 168) return true;
if (ip.Equals(IPAddress.Broadcast)) return true;
if (b[0] >= 224) return true; // multicast / reserved
return false;
}
if (ip.AddressFamily == AddressFamily.InterNetworkV6)
{
if (ip.IsIPv6LinkLocal || ip.IsIPv6SiteLocal || ip.IsIPv6Multicast) return true;
// IPv4-mapped (::ffff:a.b.c.d) — re-check the embedded v4 address.
if (ip.IsIPv4MappedToIPv6) return IsBlocked(ip.MapToIPv4());
var b = ip.GetAddressBytes();
// Unique-local fc00::/7
if ((b[0] & 0xFE) == 0xFC) return true;
return false;
}
return true; // unknown family — fail closed
}
}
/// <summary>Raised when an outbound URL is rejected by <see cref="SafeHttpGuard"/>.</summary>
public class SsrfBlockedException : Exception
{
public SsrfBlockedException(string message) : base(message) { }
}