626a9f8454
Backend security fixes from the Phase 1 register / Phase 2 roadmap (PR1 + V-01): - V-01 SSRF: new SafeHttpGuard validates outbound unsubscribe URLs (scheme allowlist + DNS-resolve-and-block private/loopback/link-local/ULA/metadata ranges), wired into UnsubscribeService; the "unsubscribe" HttpClient now disables auto-redirect so a validated external URL can't 3xx into an internal target. +33 unit tests. - V-04: session cookie SecurePolicy=Always in non-dev (SameAsRequest in dev). - V-06: UseExceptionHandler/ProblemDetails in prod; Cleanup/Unsubscribe no longer echo ex.Message to clients (logged server-side, generic message returned). - V-08: ForwardedHeaders trusted only from configurable KnownNetworks (default private ranges) + ForwardLimit, instead of trusting any client. New ForwardedHeaders config. - V-09: returnUrl validated with Url.IsLocalUrl (no open redirect via OAuth flow). - V-10: SearchService clamps Page/PageSize (<=200); Analytics clamps take/days. - V-11: baseline security headers (nosniff, X-Frame-Options DENY, Referrer-Policy, COOP) + HSTS in prod. - V-13: /app/info discloses only devMode to anonymous callers unless dev mode is on. - V-12: API container runs as non-root 'app' user (keys dir pre-owned). - V-03: Postgres + API ports bound to 127.0.0.1; POSTGRES_PASSWORD now required (no weak default fallback). API compatibility preserved (clamps not rejections; error-body shape changes only on failure paths). No DB migrations. Build + all 33 unit tests green. V-15 (MailKit NU1902) persists across versions and the SMTP path is default-off — tracked, not bumped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
95 lines
4.1 KiB
C#
95 lines
4.1 KiB
C#
using System.Net;
|
|
using System.Net.Sockets;
|
|
|
|
namespace InboxIntel.Infrastructure.Security;
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// Validates outbound request URLs before the server fetches them, to prevent
|
|
/// SSRF (V-01). Used by the unsubscribe processor (URLs come from attacker-authored
|
|
/// List-Unsubscribe headers) and intended for any future server-initiated fetch
|
|
/// (AI/breach providers). Enforces an http/https scheme allowlist and rejects hosts
|
|
/// that resolve to loopback / private / link-local / unique-local / multicast ranges
|
|
/// or the cloud metadata address. DNS is resolved and EVERY resolved address is
|
|
/// checked, defeating DNS-rebinding to an external name that points at an internal IP.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Pair this with an HttpClient configured with AllowAutoRedirect = false so a
|
|
/// permitted external URL cannot 3xx-redirect into an internal target post-validation.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
public static class SafeHttpGuard
|
|
{
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// Throws <see cref="SsrfBlockedException"/> if the URL is unsafe to fetch.
|
|
/// Returns the validated absolute Uri otherwise.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
public static async Task<Uri> ValidateAsync(string? url, CancellationToken ct = default)
|
|
{
|
|
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(url) || !Uri.TryCreate(url, UriKind.Absolute, out var uri))
|
|
throw new SsrfBlockedException("Unsubscribe target is not a valid absolute URL.");
|
|
|
|
if (uri.Scheme != Uri.UriSchemeHttp && uri.Scheme != Uri.UriSchemeHttps)
|
|
throw new SsrfBlockedException($"Disallowed URL scheme '{uri.Scheme}'.");
|
|
|
|
// Resolve the host; if it's already a literal IP, GetHostAddressesAsync returns it.
|
|
IPAddress[] addresses;
|
|
try
|
|
{
|
|
addresses = await Dns.GetHostAddressesAsync(uri.DnsSafeHost, ct);
|
|
}
|
|
catch (Exception ex) when (ex is SocketException or ArgumentException)
|
|
{
|
|
throw new SsrfBlockedException("Unsubscribe target host could not be resolved.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (addresses.Length == 0)
|
|
throw new SsrfBlockedException("Unsubscribe target host did not resolve to any address.");
|
|
|
|
foreach (var ip in addresses)
|
|
if (IsBlocked(ip))
|
|
throw new SsrfBlockedException($"Unsubscribe target resolves to a disallowed address ({ip}).");
|
|
|
|
return uri;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>True if the address is in a range we must never fetch server-side.</summary>
|
|
public static bool IsBlocked(IPAddress ip)
|
|
{
|
|
if (IPAddress.IsLoopback(ip)) return true;
|
|
|
|
if (ip.AddressFamily == AddressFamily.InterNetwork)
|
|
{
|
|
var b = ip.GetAddressBytes(); // big-endian
|
|
// 0.0.0.0/8 (this host), 10/8, 100.64/10 (CGNAT), 127/8, 169.254/16 (link-local + metadata),
|
|
// 172.16/12, 192.0.0/24, 192.168/16, 255.255.255.255
|
|
if (b[0] == 0) return true;
|
|
if (b[0] == 10) return true;
|
|
if (b[0] == 100 && b[1] >= 64 && b[1] <= 127) return true;
|
|
if (b[0] == 127) return true;
|
|
if (b[0] == 169 && b[1] == 254) return true; // includes 169.254.169.254 metadata
|
|
if (b[0] == 172 && b[1] >= 16 && b[1] <= 31) return true;
|
|
if (b[0] == 192 && b[1] == 168) return true;
|
|
if (ip.Equals(IPAddress.Broadcast)) return true;
|
|
if (b[0] >= 224) return true; // multicast / reserved
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ip.AddressFamily == AddressFamily.InterNetworkV6)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ip.IsIPv6LinkLocal || ip.IsIPv6SiteLocal || ip.IsIPv6Multicast) return true;
|
|
// IPv4-mapped (::ffff:a.b.c.d) — re-check the embedded v4 address.
|
|
if (ip.IsIPv4MappedToIPv6) return IsBlocked(ip.MapToIPv4());
|
|
var b = ip.GetAddressBytes();
|
|
// Unique-local fc00::/7
|
|
if ((b[0] & 0xFE) == 0xFC) return true;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true; // unknown family — fail closed
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>Raised when an outbound URL is rejected by <see cref="SafeHttpGuard"/>.</summary>
|
|
public class SsrfBlockedException : Exception
|
|
{
|
|
public SsrfBlockedException(string message) : base(message) { }
|
|
}
|