# M015 Cross-User Authorization Replay Report

This report covers the follow-up tenant-boundary work after `M013` and `M014`.

Related artifacts:

- `docs/security-assessments/M013-adversarial-security-assessment.md`
- `docs/security-assessments/M014-security-remediation-verification.md`
- `docs/security-assessments/M015-hostile-fixture-setup.md`
- `docs/security-assessments/M015-hostile-fixture-setup.json`
- `docs/security-assessments/M015-s02-probe-results.json`

## Test Setup

A dedicated hostile-test SQLite database was created from the current EF model because the default development DB was missing core domain tables needed for real authorization probes.

Fixture runtime:

- clean SQLite DB under `.tmp/m015-fixture`
- API started with `Data__Root=/home/pi/development/JobTracker/.tmp/m015-fixture`
- registration temporarily enabled for the fixture runtime
- two real local users created through the API:
  - `alice.m015@example.com`
  - `bob.m015@example.com`

Alice-owned fixture resources created through the real API:

- `company_id = 1`
- `job_id = 1`
- `correspondence_id = 1`
- `attachment_id = 1`

All mutating requests used the real cookie + CSRF contract.

## Cross-User Probe Summary

Bob targeted Alice’s fixture ids with a real authenticated session.

### Defended in this pass

The following probes failed closed with `404` when Bob targeted Alice’s resources:

- `GET /api/attachments/1`
- `GET /api/attachments/download/1`
- `PATCH /api/attachments/1`
- `DELETE /api/attachments/1`
- `GET /api/correspondence/1`
- `DELETE /api/correspondence/1`
- `GET /api/jobapplications/1`
- `PUT /api/jobapplications/1`
- `PATCH /api/jobapplications/1/followup`
- `GET /api/jobapplications/1/timeline`
- `GET /api/jobapplications/1/tailored-cv-draft`
- `GET /api/jobapplications/1/followup-draft`

These routes did not expose or mutate Alice-owned data in this hostile fixture pass.

## Confirmed Finding

### Cross-user read leak on job history

- **Category:** Authorization / data exposure
- **Endpoint:** `GET /api/jobapplications/{id}/history`
- **Risk:** **Medium**

#### Vulnerability

Before the fix, Bob could request Alice’s job history by raw job id and receive Alice’s `JobEvent` rows.

Observed pre-fix response:

- `GET /api/jobapplications/1/history` as Bob
- `200 OK`
- payload included Alice-owned event data, including the `Created` event for Alice’s job

#### Example exploit input

```http
GET /api/jobapplications/1/history
Cookie: jobtracker_auth=<bob session cookie>
```

#### Root cause

Two issues combined:

1. `GetHistory(...)` queried `JobEvents` directly by `JobApplicationId` without verifying that the parent job belonged to the current user.
2. `JobEvent` had no owner-scoped query filter in `Data/JobTrackerContext.cs`.

#### Fix

- `GetHistory(...)` now checks whether the requested job exists in the current user’s scoped `JobApplications` query and returns `404` if it does not.
- `JobEvent` now has an owner-scoped query filter tied to `JobApplication.OwnerUserId`.
- Added focused regression test:
  - `JobTrackerApi.Tests/JobApplicationsAuthorizationTests.cs`

#### Replay after fix

Observed post-fix response:

- `GET /api/jobapplications/1/history` as Bob
- `404 Not Found`

#### Verdict

**Fixed.**

## Automated Evidence

### Focused regression test

```bash
dotnet test JobTrackerApi.Tests/JobTrackerApi.Tests.csproj --filter JobApplicationsAuthorizationTests
```

Observed:

- passed
- verifies `GetHistory` returns `NotFound` for another user’s job

## Final Assessment

For the prioritized raw-id authorization seams exercised in this milestone:

- **confirmed and fixed:** `GET /api/jobapplications/{id}/history`
- **no finding in this fixture pass:** attachments, correspondence, primary job read/update, follow-up patch, timeline, tailored draft, follow-up draft

## Remaining Boundary

This report covers the endpoints actually exercised in the hostile fixture pass. It does **not** claim that every authorization-sensitive route in the application has been exhaustively proven safe; it closes the high-risk raw-id seams prioritized from the earlier assessment with a real two-user runtime and replay evidence.
