# JT-017 supply-chain provenance verification

## Implemented

- `global.json` requests .NET SDK `9.0.317` with patch-only roll-forward.
- CI validates and installs that exact SDK instead of accepting any .NET 9 feature band.
- API and test projects opt into NuGet lock files.
- Both direct and transitive package versions carry NuGet content hashes in committed `packages.lock.json` files.
- CI restores both projects with `--locked-mode`, so unreviewed graph drift fails before build or test.
- A standard-library tracked-file scanner blocks high-confidence credential patterns without printing values.
- A deterministic CycloneDX 1.5 generator combines the npm, NuGet and hash-locked Python dependency graphs.
- CI tests both controls, scans the tracked tree and generates a 964-component SBOM under ignored build artifacts.
- The review/exception/credential-response rules are documented in `docs/security/supply-chain-policy.md`.

## Proof

- Clean forced lock generation completed from the declared projects.
- A subsequent locked restore passed.
- Full backend suite: 719/719 passed.
- `dotnet list JobTrackerApi/JobTrackerApi.csproj package --vulnerable --include-transitive` reports no known vulnerable packages from the current NuGet source.
- Supply-chain unit tests: 3/3 passed, including seven synthetic credential canaries and deterministic npm/NuGet/PyPI coverage.
- The current tracked tree has no high-confidence credential-pattern findings.
- Repeated SBOM generation is byte-stable for unchanged lock inputs and includes React, Entity Framework Core and FastAPI representatives.

## Remaining JT-017 scope

- Pin third-party CI actions and Docker images by reviewed immutable SHA/digest.
- Hash or replace the downloaded `dotnet-install.sh` bootstrap path.
- Retain the SBOM as a CI artifact once an immutable artifact action or approved runner store is available.
- Add a policy-owned container CVE/licence scan with a tested canary once the Docker daemon/scanner is available.
- Resolve or formally isolate the remaining Torch/Transformers advisories under the model-loading threat path.

Those items require approved registry/action metadata, network-backed upstream verification or a separately reviewed scanner/update process; this increment does not invent immutable identifiers without verifying them.
