fix(security): enforce audited account, network and resource boundaries
Implement B01-B06 with regression coverage and retained validation evidence. Preserve the production ingress preflight; F04 runtime verification remains open.
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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
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using System.Net;
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using System.Security.Claims;
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using JobTrackerApi.Services;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http;
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using Xunit;
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@@ -7,6 +8,23 @@ namespace JobTrackerApi.Tests;
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public sealed class RateLimitPartitionKeysTests
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{
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[Theory]
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[InlineData("account-data")]
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[InlineData("email-send")]
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public void Account_requires_authenticated_identity_and_keeps_anonymous_addresses_separate(string policy)
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{
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var anonymous = Context("203.0.113.10", "irrelevant");
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anonymous.User = new ClaimsPrincipal(new ClaimsIdentity(new[] { new Claim(ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier, "unvalidated") }));
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var otherIp = Context("203.0.113.11", "irrelevant");
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Assert.Equal($"{policy}:ip:203.0.113.10", RateLimitPartitionKeys.Account(anonymous, policy));
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Assert.NotEqual(RateLimitPartitionKeys.Account(anonymous, policy), RateLimitPartitionKeys.Account(otherIp, policy));
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// Even an authenticated identifier shaped like an IP cannot collide with anonymous traffic.
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var owner = Context("203.0.113.11", "irrelevant");
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owner.User = new ClaimsPrincipal(new ClaimsIdentity(new[] { new Claim("sub", "203.0.113.10") }, "validated"));
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Assert.Equal($"{policy}:user:203.0.113.10", RateLimitPartitionKeys.Account(owner, policy));
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Assert.NotEqual(RateLimitPartitionKeys.Account(owner, policy), RateLimitPartitionKeys.Account(anonymous, policy));
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Public_pdf_partition_isolated_by_client_and_slug()
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{
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