docs(security): preserve offline preflight and mandatory scan gates

This commit is contained in:
cesnimda
2026-11-02 22:04:25 +01:00
parent ba826de1e5
commit 1bbd1612a9
3 changed files with 40 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# Codex Security scan register
2 November 2026. Source baseline `ba826de1e5c959352e4442ab2fec5d02445dd32d`, branch codex/security-offline-preflight. Owner confirms installation; actual tool metadata/skill files verified. Production/third parties excluded. Paid/deep compute allowance pending. ROE: ../security/00-rules-of-engagement.md.
| Phase/workflow | Status | Actual evidence and limits |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 00 define-security-policy review | NOT RUN (full workflow); resolver substep COMPLETED | Installed helper resolve-security-md --list exited 0, returned two docs-only policies. No root policy created; proposal/review/approval remains. No scan ID. |
| 01 baseline standard scan | NOT RUN | Skill/tool exposure checked; threat-model/policy and capability preflight pending. No scan artifacts or findings. |
| 03 deep scan | BLOCKED | Baseline and separately approved compute/cost scope missing. No scan launched. |
| 15 final standard and diff scans | NOT RUN | Await baseline, remediation range and independent verification. |
No scan findings, closure verdicts or human release acceptance are implied by tool availability or regression tests.
+11
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
# Security Phase 00 — offline engagement draft
2 November 2026. Owner: Connor, direct-chat roadmap authorisation. Source baseline `ba826de1e5c959352e4442ab2fec5d02445dd32d`; isolated branch `codex/security-offline-preflight`. Phase 00 is PARTIAL, not accepted.
Authorised now: source inspection, harmless synthetic local fixtures, minimal ordinary remediation within approved roadmap boundaries, sanitized reports and branch publication. No network attack target has been approved. Production, adjacent LAN services, real accounts/data, identity/payment/email providers, live AI/models, orchestrator state/keys/configuration/queue and the pre-P10 acceptance worktree are excluded.
Active staging testing is BLOCKED until exact host/IP, test users/roles, rate/concurrency/duration limits, independent database/storage, disabled egress and recovery/stop controls are approved and verified. Do not infer those from example localhost URLs or repository credentials. Emergency stop: terminate only the named audit-owned fixture process; never stop existing production/user services.
Proposed fixture boundary: disposable synthetic tenant A, tenant B and administrator; separate temporary data root and database; inert CV files and canary records; mocked OAuth, billing, email, job providers and AI. No routable credentials. Snapshot and restore qualification must precede staged mutation. This plan has not been instantiated or approved for active network testing.
Evidence: only sanitized reports/test artifacts in Git. Do not inspect real .env values, auth/signing stores or personal documents. Findings require calibrated confidence and safe reproduction; absence of a scan result proves nothing. No root SECURITY.md policy edits, suppressed findings or accepted risks are authorised by this draft.
+17
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
# Independent security assessment continuation
Phase 00 offline preflight, 2 November 2026. Branch `codex/security-offline-preflight`, application baseline `ba826de1e5c959352e4442ab2fec5d02445dd32d`. No application/security implementation changed. No staging attacks or production access.
Read the external master, complete Phase 00 prompt, ROE/finding/release/scan-register templates, repository auditor skill, Codex Security policy and standard-scan skill instructions. Remaining stage prompts must be read before entering their stages. The old master heading “DO NOT START THIS NOW” is superseded for permitted offline work by the owner's later direct execution instruction; protected gates remain.
Verified inventory: package.json identifies Next 16.4.1, React 19/MUI/TypeScript; API csproj targets .NET 9 with EF SQLite and Pomelo MariaDB, Identity/JWT, Stripe, MailKit; Python requirements identify FastAPI/transformers/document dependencies. These are source dependencies, not deployed identities or proven reachable features. Architecture overview documents nginx/static export -> API -> DB/files/internal AI and provider boundaries; runtime exposure remains unverified. Preserve canonical Career Profile, CV null-as-inherit overrides, letter history and JobApplication.Version/RD21 contracts. No technology-version vulnerability claim is made without advisory/reachability analysis.
Baseline evidence reused from this exact source ancestry: P10-04 has 89 backend and 92 frontend tests passing, independently source-bound native artifacts. CLEAN-20 has five focused browser checks plus type/lint/build evidence. These are regression evidence, not a completed security audit; this new worktree did not rerun them. Backup parser repair exists on a separate published branch and is not integrated here.
Plugin exposure: standard/deep scan, draft/artifact/progress tools and documented skill files are available. The actual policy resolver ran successfully and found only docs/cv-import/SECURITY.md and docs/redesign/phase-9/p9-requal-01/SECURITY.md. Neither is an inherited root policy for API/UI source. No baseline/deep scan has run. Root policy creation needs exact proposed diff and separate owner approval under define-security-policy; defer that decision while independent source review continues. No new charge approved; deep scan remains blocked.
Execution order: finish inventory/threat boundaries and baseline policy review; standard scan after required preflight/gates; deep scan only with cost scope; phases 02–12 offline review/fixture work in source order; active phase 13 only with approved isolated target; remediation and independent retest; final full standard/diff scans; human release gate. Read every applicable subordinate prompt before its work. Do not treat these milestones as complete based on this plan.
Open: approved ROE/staging isolation, complete trust-boundary/endpoint matrix, root policy decision, baseline/final scans, deep-scan allowance, full independent audit, provider/device/CI/deployment identity and live backup/restore. Security release recommendation: BLOCKED/NO-GO pending evidence. No new vulnerability has been asserted in Phase 00.
Next permitted action: read Phase 01 and the linked architecture topics, verify endpoint/actor boundaries from source, and prepare the policy proposal without writing an unapproved root policy. No user input is immediately required for that review.