Merge branch 'feature/auth-2fa-security' into main

Auth/registration/account-security overhaul: per-account lockout, TOTP 2FA (RFC 6238) with recovery codes, trusted devices (30-day 2FA skip), configurable email verification enforcement, and server-tracked sessions (view/revoke/sign-out-others). Full security-settings UI and login/OAuth 2FA challenge step. # Conflicts: # JobTrackerApi/Services/StartupInitializationExtensions.cs
2026-07-13 08:10:05 +02:00
parent 5e669a67e1 fb04088d62
commit 706b3ec699
35 changed files with 3287 additions and 99 deletions
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 using System.Text.Json;
 using System.Security.Claims;
+using JobTrackerApi.Data;
 using JobTrackerApi.Models;
 using JobTrackerApi.Services;
 using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization;
@@ -21,8 +22,10 @@ public sealed class AuthController : ControllerBase
    private readonly IGoogleTokenValidator _googleTokens;
    private readonly IMicrosoftTokenValidator _microsoftTokens;
    private readonly ILogger<AuthController> _logger;
+    private readonly ITwoFactorPendingTokenService _twoFactorPending;
+    private readonly JobTrackerContext _db;

-    public AuthController(IConfiguration cfg, UserManager<ApplicationUser> users, ITokenService tokens, IAppEmailSender email, IGoogleTokenValidator googleTokens, IMicrosoftTokenValidator microsoftTokens, ILogger<AuthController> logger)
+    public AuthController(IConfiguration cfg, UserManager<ApplicationUser> users, ITokenService tokens, IAppEmailSender email, IGoogleTokenValidator googleTokens, IMicrosoftTokenValidator microsoftTokens, ILogger<AuthController> logger, ITwoFactorPendingTokenService twoFactorPending, JobTrackerContext db)
    {
        _cfg = cfg;
        _users = users;
@@ -31,6 +34,8 @@ public sealed class AuthController : ControllerBase
        _googleTokens = googleTokens;
        _microsoftTokens = microsoftTokens;
        _logger = logger;
+        _twoFactorPending = twoFactorPending;
+        _db = db;
    }

    [HttpGet("config")]
@@ -41,6 +46,7 @@ public sealed class AuthController : ControllerBase
        var googleEnabled = !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace((_cfg["Auth:GoogleClientId"] ?? string.Empty).Trim());
        var microsoftEnabled = !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace((_cfg["Auth:MicrosoftClientId"] ?? string.Empty).Trim());
        var allowRegistration = _cfg.GetValue("Auth:AllowRegistration", false);
+        var requireEmailVerification = _cfg.GetValue("Auth:RequireEmailVerification", false);

        return Ok(new
        {
@@ -49,12 +55,14 @@ public sealed class AuthController : ControllerBase
            microsoftEnabled,
            localEnabled = true,
            allowRegistration,
+            requireEmailVerification,
        });
    }

    public sealed record LoginRequest(string Email, string Password, bool RememberMe = true);
    public sealed record RegisterRequest(string Email, string Password, bool RememberMe = true);
    public sealed record AuthSessionResult(bool Authenticated, string Provider);
+    public sealed record TwoFactorRequiredResult(bool RequiresTwoFactor, string PendingToken);
    public sealed record GoogleLinkDto(bool Linked, string? Email, DateTimeOffset? LinkedAt);
    public sealed record MicrosoftLinkDto(bool Linked, string? Email, DateTimeOffset? LinkedAt);
    public sealed record MeResult(
@@ -83,7 +91,7 @@ public sealed class AuthController : ControllerBase
    [HttpPost("login")]
    [AllowAnonymous]
    [EnableRateLimiting("auth-login")]
-    public async Task<ActionResult<AuthSessionResult>> Login([FromBody] LoginRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    public async Task<IActionResult> Login([FromBody] LoginRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
    {
        var email = (request.Email ?? string.Empty).Trim();
        var password = request.Password ?? string.Empty;
@@ -94,17 +102,34 @@ public sealed class AuthController : ControllerBase
        var user = await _users.FindByEmailAsync(email) ?? await _users.FindByNameAsync(email);
        if (user is null) return Unauthorized();

-        var ok = await _users.CheckPasswordAsync(user, password);
-        if (!ok) return Unauthorized();
+        // Same generic 401 whether the account doesn't exist, is locked out, or the password is
+        // wrong -- don't let a client distinguish "locked" from "wrong password" (enumeration).
+        if (await _users.IsLockedOutAsync(user)) return Unauthorized();

-        await SignInWithAppSessionAsync(user, request.RememberMe, cancellationToken);
-        return Ok(new AuthSessionResult(true, "local"));
+        var ok = await _users.CheckPasswordAsync(user, password);
+        if (!ok)
+        {
+            await _users.AccessFailedAsync(user);
+            return Unauthorized();
+        }
+
+        await _users.ResetAccessFailedCountAsync(user);
+
+        // Same enumeration-avoidance discipline as the password-check branch above: this only
+        // runs once the password is already confirmed correct, so it can never be used to probe
+        // whether an email is registered.
+        if (_cfg.GetValue("Auth:RequireEmailVerification", false) && !user.EmailConfirmed)
+        {
+            return StatusCode(StatusCodes.Status403Forbidden, new { error = "email_not_verified" });
+        }
+
+        return await CompleteSignInAsync(user, request.RememberMe, "local", cancellationToken);
    }

    [HttpPost("register")]
    [AllowAnonymous]
    [EnableRateLimiting("auth-login")]
-    public async Task<ActionResult<AuthSessionResult>> Register([FromBody] RegisterRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    public async Task<IActionResult> Register([FromBody] RegisterRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
    {
        var allow = _cfg.GetValue("Auth:AllowRegistration", false);
        if (!allow) return StatusCode(403, "Registration is disabled.");
@@ -118,21 +143,35 @@ public sealed class AuthController : ControllerBase
        var existing = await _users.FindByEmailAsync(email);
        if (existing is not null) return BadRequest("User already exists.");

-        var user = new ApplicationUser { UserName = email, Email = email, EmailConfirmed = true };
+        var requireEmailVerification = _cfg.GetValue("Auth:RequireEmailVerification", false);
+        var user = new ApplicationUser { UserName = email, Email = email, EmailConfirmed = !requireEmailVerification };
        var res = await _users.CreateAsync(user, password);
        if (!res.Succeeded)
        {
            return BadRequest(string.Join("; ", res.Errors.Select(e => e.Description)));
        }

-        await SignInWithAppSessionAsync(user, request.RememberMe, cancellationToken);
-        return Ok(new AuthSessionResult(true, "local"));
+        if (requireEmailVerification)
+        {
+            try
+            {
+                await SendVerificationEmailAsync(user, cancellationToken);
+            }
+            catch (Exception ex)
+            {
+                // ponytail: don't fail registration over a flaky email send -- the account is
+                // created either way, the user can request a fresh link via resend-verification-email.
+                _logger.LogError(ex, "Failed to send verification email to {Email}", user.Email);
+            }
+        }
+
+        return await CompleteSignInAsync(user, request.RememberMe, "local", cancellationToken);
    }

    [HttpPost("google/exchange")]
    [AllowAnonymous]
    [EnableRateLimiting("auth-login")]
-    public async Task<ActionResult<AuthSessionResult>> ExchangeGoogleToken([FromBody] GoogleTokenRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    public async Task<IActionResult> ExchangeGoogleToken([FromBody] GoogleTokenRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
    {
        var token = (request.Token ?? string.Empty).Trim();
        if (token.Length == 0) return BadRequest("Google token is required.");
@@ -193,14 +232,13 @@ public sealed class AuthController : ControllerBase
            await _users.UpdateAsync(user);
        }

-        await SignInWithAppSessionAsync(user, request.RememberMe, cancellationToken);
-        return Ok(new AuthSessionResult(true, "google"));
+        return await CompleteSignInAsync(user, request.RememberMe, "google", cancellationToken);
    }

    [HttpPost("microsoft/exchange")]
    [AllowAnonymous]
    [EnableRateLimiting("auth-login")]
-    public async Task<ActionResult<AuthSessionResult>> ExchangeMicrosoftToken([FromBody] MicrosoftTokenRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    public async Task<IActionResult> ExchangeMicrosoftToken([FromBody] MicrosoftTokenRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
    {
        var token = (request.Token ?? string.Empty).Trim();
        if (token.Length == 0) return BadRequest("Microsoft token is required.");
@@ -261,8 +299,7 @@ public sealed class AuthController : ControllerBase
            await _users.UpdateAsync(user);
        }

-        await SignInWithAppSessionAsync(user, request.RememberMe, cancellationToken);
-        return Ok(new AuthSessionResult(true, "microsoft"));
+        return await CompleteSignInAsync(user, request.RememberMe, "microsoft", cancellationToken);
    }

    [HttpPost("logout")]
@@ -650,17 +687,112 @@ public sealed class AuthController : ControllerBase
        return NoContent();
    }

+    public sealed record VerifyEmailRequest(string UserId, string Token);
+
+    [HttpPost("verify-email")]
+    [AllowAnonymous]
+    [EnableRateLimiting("auth-email")]
+    public async Task<IActionResult> VerifyEmail([FromBody] VerifyEmailRequest request)
+    {
+        var userId = (request.UserId ?? string.Empty).Trim();
+        var token = request.Token ?? string.Empty;
+
+        if (userId.Length == 0) return BadRequest("UserId is required.");
+        if (token.Length == 0) return BadRequest("Token is required.");
+
+        var user = await _users.FindByIdAsync(userId);
+        if (user is null) return BadRequest("Invalid or expired link.");
+
+        var res = await _users.ConfirmEmailAsync(user, token);
+        if (!res.Succeeded)
+        {
+            return BadRequest("Invalid or expired link.");
+        }
+
+        return NoContent();
+    }
+
+    public sealed record ResendVerificationEmailRequest(string Email);
+
+    [HttpPost("resend-verification-email")]
+    [AllowAnonymous]
+    [EnableRateLimiting("auth-email")]
+    public async Task<IActionResult> ResendVerificationEmail([FromBody] ResendVerificationEmailRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var email = (request.Email ?? string.Empty).Trim();
+        if (email.Length == 0) return NoContent();
+
+        // Mirrors request-password-reset's enumeration-avoidance: always NoContent, only actually
+        // send when there's a matching local account that still needs verifying.
+        var user = await _users.FindByEmailAsync(email);
+        if (user is null || user.EmailConfirmed || string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(user.Email) || !await _users.HasPasswordAsync(user))
+        {
+            return NoContent();
+        }
+
+        try
+        {
+            await SendVerificationEmailAsync(user, cancellationToken);
+        }
+        catch (Exception ex)
+        {
+            _logger.LogError(ex, "Failed to send verification email to {Email}", user.Email);
+            return EmailDeliveryUnavailable("Verification email could not be sent right now. Please try again later.");
+        }
+
+        return NoContent();
+    }
+
+    private async Task SendVerificationEmailAsync(ApplicationUser user, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var token = await _users.GenerateEmailConfirmationTokenAsync(user);
+
+        var baseUrl = (_cfg["App:PublicBaseUrl"] ?? string.Empty).Trim().TrimEnd('/');
+        if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(baseUrl))
+        {
+            baseUrl = $"{Request.Scheme}://{Request.Host}";
+        }
+
+        var link = $"{baseUrl}/verify-email?userId={Uri.EscapeDataString(user.Id)}&token={Uri.EscapeDataString(token)}";
+
+        await _email.SendAsync(
+            user.Email!,
+            "Verify your email",
+            $"Welcome to Jobbjakt! Please verify your email address to finish setting up your account.\n\nVerification link:\n{link}\n\nIf you did not create this account, you can ignore this email.",
+            cancellationToken
+        );
+    }
+
    private IActionResult EmailDeliveryUnavailable(string detail)
    {
        return Problem(statusCode: StatusCodes.Status503ServiceUnavailable, title: "Email delivery unavailable", detail: detail);
    }

-    private async Task SignInWithAppSessionAsync(ApplicationUser user, bool rememberMe, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    // Shared by local/Google/Microsoft sign-in. If the account has TOTP 2FA enabled, this does
+    // NOT issue the real session -- it hands back a short-lived opaque pending token that only
+    // POST /api/auth/2fa/challenge can redeem, after the caller proves they hold the TOTP device
+    // (or a recovery code). This is the gate that makes 2FA actually mandatory rather than
+    // decorative: skipping straight to AppSessionIssuer here would defeat the whole feature.
+    private async Task<IActionResult> CompleteSignInAsync(ApplicationUser user, bool rememberMe, string provider, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
    {
-        var token = await _tokens.CreateAccessTokenAsync(user, cancellationToken);
-        var secure = Request.IsHttps || string.Equals(Request.Headers["X-Forwarded-Proto"], "https", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
-        Response.Cookies.Append(AuthSessionOptions.SessionCookieName, token, AuthSessionOptions.BuildSessionCookie(rememberMe, secure));
-        EnsureCsrfCookie(rememberMe, secure);
+        // "Trust this device" cookie check happens BEFORE the 2FA gate: if it matches a
+        // non-expired row for this exact user, skip straight to a real session, same as if 2FA
+        // weren't required at all. Falls through to the normal gate for any other outcome
+        // (no cookie, wrong user, expired, revoked) -- never errors, just doesn't skip.
+        if (user.TwoFactorEnabled && await TrustedDeviceService.IsDeviceTrustedAsync(_db, Request, user.Id, cancellationToken))
+        {
+            await AppSessionIssuer.IssueAsync(Request, Response, _tokens, _db, _cfg, user, rememberMe, cancellationToken);
+            return Ok(new AuthSessionResult(true, provider));
+        }
+
+        if (user.TwoFactorEnabled)
+        {
+            var pendingToken = _twoFactorPending.IssuePendingToken(user.Id, rememberMe);
+            return Ok(new TwoFactorRequiredResult(true, pendingToken));
+        }
+
+        await AppSessionIssuer.IssueAsync(Request, Response, _tokens, _db, _cfg, user, rememberMe, cancellationToken);
+        return Ok(new AuthSessionResult(true, provider));
    }

    private void EnsureCsrfCookie(bool persistent, bool? secureOverride = null)
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+using JobTrackerApi.Data;
+using JobTrackerApi.Models;
+using JobTrackerApi.Services;
+using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization;
+using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity;
+using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc;
+using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore;
+
+namespace JobTrackerApi.Controllers;
+
+// List/revoke the server-tracked UserSession rows behind the JWTs AppSessionIssuer hands out.
+// Not 2FA-specific (any local-auth user has sessions, 2FA or not), hence its own small controller
+// rather than folding into TwoFactorController.
+[ApiController]
+[Route("api/auth/sessions")]
+[Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")]
+public sealed class SessionsController : ControllerBase
+{
+    private readonly UserManager<ApplicationUser> _users;
+    private readonly JobTrackerContext _db;
+
+    public SessionsController(UserManager<ApplicationUser> users, JobTrackerContext db)
+    {
+        _users = users;
+        _db = db;
+    }
+
+    public sealed record SessionDto(string Id, string? DeviceLabel, DateTimeOffset CreatedAtUtc, DateTimeOffset LastSeenAtUtc, DateTimeOffset ExpiresAtUtc, bool IsCurrentSession);
+
+    private string? CurrentSid => User.FindFirst("sid")?.Value;
+
+    [HttpGet]
+    public async Task<IActionResult> List(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var user = await _users.GetUserAsync(User);
+        if (user is null) return Unauthorized();
+
+        var now = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
+        var currentSid = CurrentSid;
+        // IgnoreQueryFilters + an explicit UserId filter, same convention as
+        // TrustedDeviceService/TwoFactorController's device-list queries.
+        // Equality-only in the DB query, then filter/sort DateTimeOffset client-side: SQLite's EF
+        // Core provider cannot translate ">" or ORDER BY over DateTimeOffset to SQL ("SQLite does
+        // not support expressions of type 'DateTimeOffset' in ORDER BY clauses"), so ExpiresAtUtc
+        // comparison and the LastSeenAtUtc sort have to happen after materializing the (small,
+        // per-user) row set.
+        var candidates = await _db.UserSessions.IgnoreQueryFilters()
+            .Where(x => x.UserId == user.Id && x.RevokedAtUtc == null)
+            .ToListAsync(cancellationToken);
+
+        var sessions = candidates
+            .Where(x => x.ExpiresAtUtc > now)
+            .OrderByDescending(x => x.LastSeenAtUtc)
+            .Select(x => new SessionDto(x.Id, x.DeviceLabel, x.CreatedAtUtc, x.LastSeenAtUtc, x.ExpiresAtUtc, x.Id == currentSid))
+            .ToList();
+
+        return Ok(sessions);
+    }
+
+    [HttpDelete("{id}")]
+    public async Task<IActionResult> Revoke(string id, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var user = await _users.GetUserAsync(User);
+        if (user is null) return Unauthorized();
+
+        var session = await _db.UserSessions.IgnoreQueryFilters().FirstOrDefaultAsync(x => x.Id == id && x.UserId == user.Id, cancellationToken);
+        if (session is null) return NotFound();
+
+        session.RevokedAtUtc = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
+        await _db.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken);
+
+        if (string.Equals(id, CurrentSid, StringComparison.Ordinal))
+        {
+            var secure = Request.IsHttps || string.Equals(Request.Headers["X-Forwarded-Proto"], "https", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+            Response.Cookies.Delete(AuthSessionOptions.SessionCookieName, AuthSessionOptions.BuildExpiredCookie(secure));
+        }
+
+        return NoContent();
+    }
+
+    [HttpPost("revoke-others")]
+    public async Task<IActionResult> RevokeOthers(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var user = await _users.GetUserAsync(User);
+        if (user is null) return Unauthorized();
+
+        var currentSid = CurrentSid;
+        var now = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
+        var others = await _db.UserSessions.IgnoreQueryFilters()
+            .Where(x => x.UserId == user.Id && x.RevokedAtUtc == null && x.Id != currentSid)
+            .ToListAsync(cancellationToken);
+
+        foreach (var session in others)
+        {
+            session.RevokedAtUtc = now;
+        }
+        if (others.Count > 0)
+        {
+            await _db.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken);
+        }
+
+        return NoContent();
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+using System.Security.Cryptography;
+using System.Text;
+using JobTrackerApi.Data;
+using JobTrackerApi.Models;
+using JobTrackerApi.Services;
+using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization;
+using Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection;
+using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity;
+using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc;
+using Microsoft.AspNetCore.RateLimiting;
+using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore;
+using OtpNet;
+using QRCoder;
+
+namespace JobTrackerApi.Controllers;
+
+// TOTP 2FA (RFC 6238) + recovery codes. Split out from AuthController (already 700+ lines)
+// rather than growing it further; shares the session cookie logic via AppSessionIssuer and the
+// pending-token handoff via ITwoFactorPendingTokenService.
+[ApiController]
+[Route("api/auth/2fa")]
+public sealed class TwoFactorController : ControllerBase
+{
+    private const int RecoveryCodeCount = 10;
+
+    private readonly UserManager<ApplicationUser> _users;
+    private readonly ITokenService _tokens;
+    private readonly JobTrackerContext _db;
+    private readonly ITwoFactorPendingTokenService _pending;
+    private readonly IDataProtector _protector;
+    private readonly IConfiguration _cfg;
+
+    public TwoFactorController(UserManager<ApplicationUser> users, ITokenService tokens, JobTrackerContext db, ITwoFactorPendingTokenService pending, IDataProtectionProvider protectionProvider, IConfiguration cfg)
+    {
+        _users = users;
+        _tokens = tokens;
+        _db = db;
+        _pending = pending;
+        _protector = protectionProvider.CreateProtector("totp-secret-v1");
+        _cfg = cfg;
+    }
+
+    public sealed record PasswordConfirmRequest(string CurrentPassword);
+    public sealed record SetupResult(string ManualEntryKey, string QrCodeDataUrl);
+    public sealed record VerifySetupRequest(string Code);
+    public sealed record VerifySetupResult(bool Enabled, IReadOnlyList<string> RecoveryCodes);
+    public sealed record StatusResult(bool Enabled, DateTimeOffset? EnabledAtUtc);
+    public sealed record RecoveryCodesResult(IReadOnlyList<string> RecoveryCodes);
+    public sealed record ChallengeRequest(string PendingToken, string Code, bool TrustDevice = false);
+    public sealed record TrustedDeviceDto(int Id, string? DeviceLabel, DateTimeOffset CreatedAtUtc, DateTimeOffset LastSeenAtUtc, DateTimeOffset ExpiresAtUtc, bool IsCurrentDevice);
+
+    [HttpPost("setup")]
+    [Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")]
+    [EnableRateLimiting("auth-login")]
+    public async Task<IActionResult> Setup([FromBody] PasswordConfirmRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var user = await _users.GetUserAsync(User);
+        if (user is null) return Unauthorized();
+
+        if (!await _users.CheckPasswordAsync(user, request.CurrentPassword ?? string.Empty))
+        {
+            return BadRequest("Current password is incorrect.");
+        }
+
+        var secretBytes = KeyGeneration.GenerateRandomKey(20);
+        var base32Secret = Base32Encoding.ToString(secretBytes);
+
+        user.TotpPendingSecretEncrypted = _protector.Protect(base32Secret);
+        var result = await _users.UpdateAsync(user);
+        if (!result.Succeeded)
+        {
+            return BadRequest(string.Join("; ", result.Errors.Select(e => e.Description)));
+        }
+
+        var issuer = "JobTracker";
+        var label = Uri.EscapeDataString($"{issuer}:{user.Email}");
+        var otpauthUri = $"otpauth://totp/{label}?secret={base32Secret}&issuer={Uri.EscapeDataString(issuer)}&digits=6&period=30";
+
+        using var qrGenerator = new QRCodeGenerator();
+        using var qrData = qrGenerator.CreateQrCode(otpauthUri, QRCodeGenerator.ECCLevel.Q);
+        var pngQr = new PngByteQRCode(qrData);
+        var qrPngBytes = pngQr.GetGraphic(10);
+        var qrDataUrl = $"data:image/png;base64,{Convert.ToBase64String(qrPngBytes)}";
+
+        return Ok(new SetupResult(base32Secret, qrDataUrl));
+    }
+
+    [HttpPost("verify-setup")]
+    [Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")]
+    [EnableRateLimiting("auth-login")]
+    public async Task<IActionResult> VerifySetup([FromBody] VerifySetupRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var user = await _users.GetUserAsync(User);
+        if (user is null) return Unauthorized();
+
+        if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(user.TotpPendingSecretEncrypted))
+        {
+            return BadRequest("No pending 2FA setup. Call setup first.");
+        }
+
+        var base32Secret = _protector.Unprotect(user.TotpPendingSecretEncrypted);
+        if (!VerifyCode(base32Secret, request.Code))
+        {
+            return Unauthorized();
+        }
+
+        user.TotpSecretEncrypted = user.TotpPendingSecretEncrypted;
+        user.TotpPendingSecretEncrypted = null;
+        user.TwoFactorEnabled = true;
+        user.TotpEnabledAtUtc = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
+
+        var result = await _users.UpdateAsync(user);
+        if (!result.Succeeded)
+        {
+            return BadRequest(string.Join("; ", result.Errors.Select(e => e.Description)));
+        }
+
+        var codes = await RegenerateRecoveryCodesAsync(user.Id, cancellationToken);
+        return Ok(new VerifySetupResult(true, codes));
+    }
+
+    [HttpPost("disable")]
+    [Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")]
+    [EnableRateLimiting("auth-login")]
+    public async Task<IActionResult> Disable([FromBody] PasswordConfirmRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var user = await _users.GetUserAsync(User);
+        if (user is null) return Unauthorized();
+
+        if (!await _users.CheckPasswordAsync(user, request.CurrentPassword ?? string.Empty))
+        {
+            return BadRequest("Current password is incorrect.");
+        }
+
+        user.TotpSecretEncrypted = null;
+        user.TotpPendingSecretEncrypted = null;
+        user.TwoFactorEnabled = false;
+        user.TotpEnabledAtUtc = null;
+
+        var result = await _users.UpdateAsync(user);
+        if (!result.Succeeded)
+        {
+            return BadRequest(string.Join("; ", result.Errors.Select(e => e.Description)));
+        }
+
+        await RemoveAllRecoveryCodesAsync(user.Id, cancellationToken);
+        return NoContent();
+    }
+
+    [HttpGet("status")]
+    [Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")]
+    public async Task<IActionResult> Status()
+    {
+        var user = await _users.GetUserAsync(User);
+        if (user is null) return Unauthorized();
+
+        return Ok(new StatusResult(user.TwoFactorEnabled, user.TotpEnabledAtUtc));
+    }
+
+    [HttpPost("recovery-codes/regenerate")]
+    [Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")]
+    [EnableRateLimiting("auth-login")]
+    public async Task<IActionResult> RegenerateRecoveryCodes([FromBody] PasswordConfirmRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var user = await _users.GetUserAsync(User);
+        if (user is null) return Unauthorized();
+
+        if (!user.TwoFactorEnabled)
+        {
+            return BadRequest("Two-factor authentication is not enabled.");
+        }
+
+        if (!await _users.CheckPasswordAsync(user, request.CurrentPassword ?? string.Empty))
+        {
+            return BadRequest("Current password is incorrect.");
+        }
+
+        var codes = await RegenerateRecoveryCodesAsync(user.Id, cancellationToken);
+        return Ok(new RecoveryCodesResult(codes));
+    }
+
+    [HttpPost("challenge")]
+    [AllowAnonymous]
+    [EnableRateLimiting("auth-2fa-challenge")]
+    public async Task<IActionResult> Challenge([FromBody] ChallengeRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var pendingToken = (request.PendingToken ?? string.Empty).Trim();
+        var code = (request.Code ?? string.Empty).Trim();
+        if (pendingToken.Length == 0 || code.Length == 0) return Unauthorized();
+
+        // Peek without consuming: only burn the pending token once the code actually checks out,
+        // so a mistyped code doesn't force the user back through password login.
+        var session = _pending.Resolve(pendingToken, consume: false);
+        if (session is null) return Unauthorized();
+
+        var user = await _users.FindByIdAsync(session.UserId);
+        if (user is null || !user.TwoFactorEnabled || string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(user.TotpSecretEncrypted))
+        {
+            return Unauthorized();
+        }
+
+        var base32Secret = _protector.Unprotect(user.TotpSecretEncrypted);
+        var verified = VerifyCode(base32Secret, code) || await TryConsumeRecoveryCodeAsync(user.Id, code, cancellationToken);
+        if (!verified) return Unauthorized();
+
+        _pending.Resolve(pendingToken, consume: true);
+        await AppSessionIssuer.IssueAsync(Request, Response, _tokens, _db, _cfg, user, session.RememberMe, cancellationToken);
+
+        if (request.TrustDevice)
+        {
+            await TrustedDeviceService.IssueAsync(_db, Request, Response, user.Id, cancellationToken);
+        }
+
+        return Ok(new AuthController.AuthSessionResult(true, "local"));
+    }
+
+    [HttpGet("trusted-devices")]
+    [Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")]
+    public async Task<IActionResult> ListTrustedDevices(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var user = await _users.GetUserAsync(User);
+        if (user is null) return Unauthorized();
+
+        var currentHash = TrustedDeviceService.CurrentDeviceTokenHash(Request);
+        // SQLite/Pomelo cannot translate DateTimeOffset ORDER BY to SQL (same issue as the
+        // expiry check in TrustedDeviceService), so sort after materializing.
+        var devices = await _db.TrustedDevices
+            .Where(x => x.UserId == user.Id)
+            .Select(x => new TrustedDeviceDto(x.Id, x.DeviceLabel, x.CreatedAtUtc, x.LastSeenAtUtc, x.ExpiresAtUtc, currentHash != null && x.TokenHash == currentHash))
+            .ToListAsync(cancellationToken);
+
+        return Ok(devices.OrderByDescending(x => x.LastSeenAtUtc).ToList());
+    }
+
+    [HttpDelete("trusted-devices/{id:int}")]
+    [Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")]
+    public async Task<IActionResult> RevokeTrustedDevice(int id, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var user = await _users.GetUserAsync(User);
+        if (user is null) return Unauthorized();
+
+        var device = await _db.TrustedDevices.FirstOrDefaultAsync(x => x.Id == id && x.UserId == user.Id, cancellationToken);
+        if (device is null) return NotFound();
+
+        var currentHash = TrustedDeviceService.CurrentDeviceTokenHash(Request);
+        var isCurrentDevice = currentHash != null && string.Equals(device.TokenHash, currentHash, StringComparison.Ordinal);
+
+        _db.TrustedDevices.Remove(device);
+        await _db.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken);
+
+        if (isCurrentDevice)
+        {
+            TrustedDeviceService.ClearCookie(Request, Response);
+        }
+
+        return NoContent();
+    }
+
+    [HttpPost("trusted-devices/revoke-all")]
+    [Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")]
+    public async Task<IActionResult> RevokeAllTrustedDevices(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var user = await _users.GetUserAsync(User);
+        if (user is null) return Unauthorized();
+
+        var devices = await _db.TrustedDevices.Where(x => x.UserId == user.Id).ToListAsync(cancellationToken);
+        if (devices.Count > 0)
+        {
+            _db.TrustedDevices.RemoveRange(devices);
+            await _db.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken);
+        }
+
+        TrustedDeviceService.ClearCookie(Request, Response);
+        return NoContent();
+    }
+
+    private static bool VerifyCode(string base32Secret, string? code)
+    {
+        code = (code ?? string.Empty).Trim();
+        if (code.Length == 0) return false;
+
+        var totp = new Totp(Base32Encoding.ToBytes(base32Secret));
+        // +-1 step (30s) of drift, the RFC 6238 standard tolerance for clock skew between the
+        // authenticator app and the server.
+        return totp.VerifyTotp(code, out _, new VerificationWindow(1, 1));
+    }
+
+    private async Task<bool> TryConsumeRecoveryCodeAsync(string userId, string code, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var hash = HashRecoveryCode(code);
+        var match = await _db.TwoFactorRecoveryCodes
+            .IgnoreQueryFilters()
+            .FirstOrDefaultAsync(x => x.UserId == userId && x.CodeHash == hash && x.UsedAtUtc == null, cancellationToken);
+        if (match is null) return false;
+
+        match.UsedAtUtc = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
+        await _db.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken);
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    private async Task<IReadOnlyList<string>> RegenerateRecoveryCodesAsync(string userId, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        await RemoveAllRecoveryCodesAsync(userId, cancellationToken);
+
+        var now = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
+        var plainCodes = new List<string>(RecoveryCodeCount);
+        var rows = new List<TwoFactorRecoveryCode>(RecoveryCodeCount);
+        for (var i = 0; i < RecoveryCodeCount; i++)
+        {
+            var plain = GenerateRecoveryCode();
+            plainCodes.Add(plain);
+            rows.Add(new TwoFactorRecoveryCode { UserId = userId, CodeHash = HashRecoveryCode(plain), CreatedAtUtc = now });
+        }
+
+        _db.TwoFactorRecoveryCodes.AddRange(rows);
+        await _db.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken);
+        return plainCodes;
+    }
+
+    private async Task RemoveAllRecoveryCodesAsync(string userId, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        var existing = await _db.TwoFactorRecoveryCodes.IgnoreQueryFilters().Where(x => x.UserId == userId).ToListAsync(cancellationToken);
+        if (existing.Count == 0) return;
+        _db.TwoFactorRecoveryCodes.RemoveRange(existing);
+        await _db.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken);
+    }
+
+    private static string GenerateRecoveryCode()
+    {
+        var hex = Convert.ToHexString(RandomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(5)).ToLowerInvariant(); // 10 hex chars, 40 bits
+        return $"{hex[..5]}-{hex[5..]}";
+    }
+
+    // ponytail: recovery codes are already random high-entropy tokens (not user-chosen
+    // passwords), so a plain SHA-256 hash is sufficient -- no per-code salt or PBKDF2 needed.
+    private static string HashRecoveryCode(string code)
+    {
+        var normalized = code.Trim().ToLowerInvariant();
+        return Convert.ToHexString(SHA256.HashData(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(normalized))).ToLowerInvariant();
+    }
+}