feat(auth): add trusted-device 30-day 2FA skip (backend)

Adds a "trust this device" option to the 2FA challenge: on success, mints a
random token (only its SHA-256 hash is stored), sets it as a new httpOnly,
Secure, SameSite=Strict cookie, and records a TrustedDevice row. AuthController
checks that cookie for the exact signing-in user before gating on 2FA -- a
mismatched user, expired, or revoked device falls through to the normal 2FA
prompt, never errors. TwoFactorController also exposes list/revoke/revoke-all
endpoints for managing trusted devices, scoped to the owning user.

Schema added via the existing raw-SQL reconciler (SQLite + MySQL dialects),
not EF migrations, matching this repo's established pattern.
This commit is contained in:
cesnimda
2026-07-13 01:02:35 +02:00
parent b85dc1ffb7
commit b914630657
10 changed files with 554 additions and 9 deletions
+14 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Security.Claims;
using JobTrackerApi.Data;
using JobTrackerApi.Models;
using JobTrackerApi.Services;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization;
@@ -22,8 +23,9 @@ public sealed class AuthController : ControllerBase
private readonly IMicrosoftTokenValidator _microsoftTokens;
private readonly ILogger<AuthController> _logger;
private readonly ITwoFactorPendingTokenService _twoFactorPending;
private readonly JobTrackerContext _db;
public AuthController(IConfiguration cfg, UserManager<ApplicationUser> users, ITokenService tokens, IAppEmailSender email, IGoogleTokenValidator googleTokens, IMicrosoftTokenValidator microsoftTokens, ILogger<AuthController> logger, ITwoFactorPendingTokenService twoFactorPending)
public AuthController(IConfiguration cfg, UserManager<ApplicationUser> users, ITokenService tokens, IAppEmailSender email, IGoogleTokenValidator googleTokens, IMicrosoftTokenValidator microsoftTokens, ILogger<AuthController> logger, ITwoFactorPendingTokenService twoFactorPending, JobTrackerContext db)
{
_cfg = cfg;
_users = users;
@@ -33,6 +35,7 @@ public sealed class AuthController : ControllerBase
_microsoftTokens = microsoftTokens;
_logger = logger;
_twoFactorPending = twoFactorPending;
_db = db;
}
[HttpGet("config")]
@@ -671,6 +674,16 @@ public sealed class AuthController : ControllerBase
// decorative: skipping straight to AppSessionIssuer here would defeat the whole feature.
private async Task<IActionResult> CompleteSignInAsync(ApplicationUser user, bool rememberMe, string provider, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
// "Trust this device" cookie check happens BEFORE the 2FA gate: if it matches a
// non-expired row for this exact user, skip straight to a real session, same as if 2FA
// weren't required at all. Falls through to the normal gate for any other outcome
// (no cookie, wrong user, expired, revoked) -- never errors, just doesn't skip.
if (user.TwoFactorEnabled && await TrustedDeviceService.IsDeviceTrustedAsync(_db, Request, user.Id, cancellationToken))
{
await AppSessionIssuer.IssueAsync(Request, Response, _tokens, user, rememberMe, cancellationToken);
return Ok(new AuthSessionResult(true, provider));
}
if (user.TwoFactorEnabled)
{
var pendingToken = _twoFactorPending.IssuePendingToken(user.Id, rememberMe);
@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ public sealed class TwoFactorController : ControllerBase
public sealed record VerifySetupResult(bool Enabled, IReadOnlyList<string> RecoveryCodes);
public sealed record StatusResult(bool Enabled, DateTimeOffset? EnabledAtUtc);
public sealed record RecoveryCodesResult(IReadOnlyList<string> RecoveryCodes);
public sealed record ChallengeRequest(string PendingToken, string Code);
public sealed record ChallengeRequest(string PendingToken, string Code, bool TrustDevice = false);
public sealed record TrustedDeviceDto(int Id, string? DeviceLabel, DateTimeOffset CreatedAtUtc, DateTimeOffset LastSeenAtUtc, DateTimeOffset ExpiresAtUtc, bool IsCurrentDevice);
[HttpPost("setup")]
[Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")]
@@ -202,9 +203,74 @@ public sealed class TwoFactorController : ControllerBase
_pending.Resolve(pendingToken, consume: true);
await AppSessionIssuer.IssueAsync(Request, Response, _tokens, user, session.RememberMe, cancellationToken);
if (request.TrustDevice)
{
await TrustedDeviceService.IssueAsync(_db, Request, Response, user.Id, cancellationToken);
}
return Ok(new AuthController.AuthSessionResult(true, "local"));
}
[HttpGet("trusted-devices")]
[Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")]
public async Task<IActionResult> ListTrustedDevices(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var user = await _users.GetUserAsync(User);
if (user is null) return Unauthorized();
var currentHash = TrustedDeviceService.CurrentDeviceTokenHash(Request);
var devices = await _db.TrustedDevices
.Where(x => x.UserId == user.Id)
.OrderByDescending(x => x.LastSeenAtUtc)
.Select(x => new TrustedDeviceDto(x.Id, x.DeviceLabel, x.CreatedAtUtc, x.LastSeenAtUtc, x.ExpiresAtUtc, currentHash != null && x.TokenHash == currentHash))
.ToListAsync(cancellationToken);
return Ok(devices);
}
[HttpDelete("trusted-devices/{id:int}")]
[Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")]
public async Task<IActionResult> RevokeTrustedDevice(int id, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var user = await _users.GetUserAsync(User);
if (user is null) return Unauthorized();
var device = await _db.TrustedDevices.FirstOrDefaultAsync(x => x.Id == id && x.UserId == user.Id, cancellationToken);
if (device is null) return NotFound();
var currentHash = TrustedDeviceService.CurrentDeviceTokenHash(Request);
var isCurrentDevice = currentHash != null && string.Equals(device.TokenHash, currentHash, StringComparison.Ordinal);
_db.TrustedDevices.Remove(device);
await _db.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken);
if (isCurrentDevice)
{
TrustedDeviceService.ClearCookie(Request, Response);
}
return NoContent();
}
[HttpPost("trusted-devices/revoke-all")]
[Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")]
public async Task<IActionResult> RevokeAllTrustedDevices(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var user = await _users.GetUserAsync(User);
if (user is null) return Unauthorized();
var devices = await _db.TrustedDevices.Where(x => x.UserId == user.Id).ToListAsync(cancellationToken);
if (devices.Count > 0)
{
_db.TrustedDevices.RemoveRange(devices);
await _db.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken);
}
TrustedDeviceService.ClearCookie(Request, Response);
return NoContent();
}
private static bool VerifyCode(string base32Secret, string? code)
{
code = (code ?? string.Empty).Trim();
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ public static class AuthSessionOptions
public const string SessionCookieName = "jobtracker_auth";
public const string CsrfCookieName = "XSRF-TOKEN";
public const string CsrfHeaderName = "X-CSRF-TOKEN";
public const string TrustedDeviceCookieName = "jobtracker_td";
public static CookieOptions BuildSessionCookie(bool persistent, bool secure)
{
@@ -75,4 +76,35 @@ public static class AuthSessionOptions
MaxAge = TimeSpan.Zero,
};
}
// Stricter than the session cookie (SameSite=Strict, never HttpOnly=false): this cookie's
// only job is "skip the 2FA prompt", so it must never be readable by JS and should not even
// be sent on cross-site navigations.
public static CookieOptions BuildTrustedDeviceCookie(bool secure)
{
return new CookieOptions
{
HttpOnly = true,
IsEssential = true,
SameSite = SameSiteMode.Strict,
Secure = secure,
Path = "/",
Expires = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow.AddDays(30),
MaxAge = TimeSpan.FromDays(30),
};
}
public static CookieOptions BuildExpiredTrustedDeviceCookie(bool secure)
{
return new CookieOptions
{
HttpOnly = true,
IsEssential = true,
SameSite = SameSiteMode.Strict,
Secure = secure,
Path = "/",
Expires = DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
MaxAge = TimeSpan.Zero,
};
}
}
@@ -647,11 +647,30 @@ public static class StartupInitializationExtensions
Exec(c, """CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS "IX_TwoFactorRecoveryCodes_UserId_UsedAtUtc" ON "TwoFactorRecoveryCodes" ("UserId", "UsedAtUtc");""");
}
static void EnsureTrustedDevicesTable(DbConnection c)
{
Exec(c, """
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "TrustedDevices" (
"Id" INTEGER NOT NULL CONSTRAINT "PK_TrustedDevices" PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
"UserId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"TokenHash" TEXT NOT NULL,
"DeviceLabel" TEXT NULL,
"CreatedAtUtc" TEXT NOT NULL,
"LastSeenAtUtc" TEXT NOT NULL,
"ExpiresAtUtc" TEXT NOT NULL
);
""");
Exec(c, """CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS "IX_TrustedDevices_UserId" ON "TrustedDevices" ("UserId");""");
Exec(c, """CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS "IX_TrustedDevices_TokenHash" ON "TrustedDevices" ("TokenHash");""");
}
EnsureGmailConnectionsTable(conn);
EnsureMicrosoftGraphConnectionsTable(conn);
EnsureImapConnectionsTable(conn);
EnsureCvTables(conn);
EnsureTwoFactorRecoveryCodesTable(conn);
EnsureTrustedDevicesTable(conn);
// Legacy DB signature: migration history exists (AddCorrespondence applied), but 20260310195000 not recorded,
// and at least one of the new columns already exists.
@@ -1028,6 +1047,38 @@ public static class StartupInitializationExtensions
cmd.ExecuteNonQuery();
}
if (!HasMySqlTable(conn, "TrustedDevices"))
{
using var cmd = conn.CreateCommand();
cmd.CommandText = @"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `TrustedDevices` (
`Id` int NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
`UserId` varchar(255) NOT NULL,
`TokenHash` varchar(255) NOT NULL,
`DeviceLabel` varchar(255) NULL,
`CreatedAtUtc` datetime(6) NOT NULL,
`LastSeenAtUtc` datetime(6) NOT NULL,
`ExpiresAtUtc` datetime(6) NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (`Id`)
);";
cmd.ExecuteNonQuery();
}
EnsureMySqlAutoIncrementPrimaryKey(conn, "TrustedDevices", "Id");
if (!MySqlIndexExists(conn, "TrustedDevices", "IX_TrustedDevices_UserId"))
{
using var cmd = conn.CreateCommand();
cmd.CommandText = "CREATE INDEX `IX_TrustedDevices_UserId` ON `TrustedDevices` (`UserId`);";
cmd.ExecuteNonQuery();
}
if (!MySqlIndexExists(conn, "TrustedDevices", "IX_TrustedDevices_TokenHash"))
{
using var cmd = conn.CreateCommand();
cmd.CommandText = "CREATE INDEX `IX_TrustedDevices_TokenHash` ON `TrustedDevices` (`TokenHash`);";
cmd.ExecuteNonQuery();
}
if (!MySqlIndexExists(conn, "Companies", "IX_Companies_OwnerUserId"))
{
using var cmd = conn.CreateCommand();
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text;
using JobTrackerApi.Data;
using JobTrackerApi.Models;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http;
using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore;
namespace JobTrackerApi.Services;
// "Trust this device for 30 days" -- lets a 2FA challenge be skipped on the same browser for a
// month. Shared by AuthController (checks the cookie before gating on 2FA) and
// TwoFactorController (issues/lists/revokes the cookie's backing row). Never stores the
// plaintext token, only its SHA-256 hash.
public static class TrustedDeviceService
{
private static readonly TimeSpan Lifetime = TimeSpan.FromDays(30);
// Only returns true (and thus skips 2FA) when the cookie's hash matches a non-expired row
// for THIS SPECIFIC user -- UserId is part of the DB query itself, not a check applied
// after the fact, so a trusted-device cookie minted for user A can never skip 2FA for user
// B even if somehow presented on their request.
public static async Task<bool> IsDeviceTrustedAsync(JobTrackerContext db, HttpRequest request, string userId, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var token = request.Cookies[AuthSessionOptions.TrustedDeviceCookieName];
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(token)) return false;
var hash = HashToken(token);
var now = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
var match = await db.TrustedDevices
.IgnoreQueryFilters()
.FirstOrDefaultAsync(x => x.UserId == userId && x.TokenHash == hash && x.ExpiresAtUtc > now, cancellationToken);
if (match is null) return false;
match.LastSeenAtUtc = now;
await db.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken);
return true;
}
public static async Task IssueAsync(JobTrackerContext db, HttpRequest request, HttpResponse response, string userId, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var token = Convert.ToHexString(RandomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(32)).ToLowerInvariant();
var now = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
db.TrustedDevices.Add(new TrustedDevice
{
UserId = userId,
TokenHash = HashToken(token),
DeviceLabel = DescribeUserAgent(request.Headers["User-Agent"].ToString()),
CreatedAtUtc = now,
LastSeenAtUtc = now,
ExpiresAtUtc = now.Add(Lifetime),
});
await db.SaveChangesAsync(cancellationToken);
var secure = request.IsHttps || string.Equals(request.Headers["X-Forwarded-Proto"], "https", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
response.Cookies.Append(AuthSessionOptions.TrustedDeviceCookieName, token, AuthSessionOptions.BuildTrustedDeviceCookie(secure));
}
public static void ClearCookie(HttpRequest request, HttpResponse response)
{
var secure = request.IsHttps || string.Equals(request.Headers["X-Forwarded-Proto"], "https", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
response.Cookies.Delete(AuthSessionOptions.TrustedDeviceCookieName, AuthSessionOptions.BuildExpiredTrustedDeviceCookie(secure));
}
// Used to flag "this device" in the trusted-devices list without ever sending a token or
// hash to the client -- just a boolean per row.
public static string? CurrentDeviceTokenHash(HttpRequest request)
{
var token = request.Cookies[AuthSessionOptions.TrustedDeviceCookieName];
return string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(token) ? null : HashToken(token);
}
public static string HashToken(string token)
{
return Convert.ToHexString(SHA256.HashData(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(token.Trim()))).ToLowerInvariant();
}
private static readonly (string Needle, string Label)[] BrowserMarkers =
{
("Edg/", "Edge"),
("OPR/", "Opera"),
("Chrome/", "Chrome"),
("Firefox/", "Firefox"),
("Safari/", "Safari"),
};
private static readonly (string Needle, string Label)[] OsMarkers =
{
("Windows", "Windows"),
("Mac OS X", "Mac"),
("iPhone", "iOS"),
("iPad", "iOS"),
("Android", "Android"),
("Linux", "Linux"),
};
// ponytail: substring sniffing, not a real UA parser -- this only feeds a display label in
// a security-settings list ("Chrome on Windows"), nothing security-relevant depends on it.
private static string? DescribeUserAgent(string? userAgent)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(userAgent)) return null;
var browser = BrowserMarkers.FirstOrDefault(m => userAgent.Contains(m.Needle, StringComparison.Ordinal)).Label;
var os = OsMarkers.FirstOrDefault(m => userAgent.Contains(m.Needle, StringComparison.Ordinal)).Label;
if (browser is null && os is null) return userAgent.Length > 80 ? userAgent[..80] : userAgent;
if (browser is null) return os;
if (os is null) return browser;
return $"{browser} on {os}";
}
}