fix(ai): confine benchmark requests

Disable proxy discovery and redirect following so validated Ollama origins cannot escape the approved network boundary. Run the standard-library safety suite in CI.

scripts/run-ollama-evaluation.py

@@ -40,6 +40,22 @@ TASK_INSTRUCTIONS = {
 }
 
 
+class NoRedirectHandler(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    """Keep a validated Ollama origin from redirecting a request elsewhere."""
+
+    def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl):  # noqa: ANN001
+        return None
+
+
+def build_http_opener() -> urllib.request.OpenerDirector:
+    # Do not inherit HTTP(S)_PROXY from the operator shell and never follow redirects. The
+    # explicitly validated loopback/private origin is the only network boundary this tool may use.
+    return urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}), NoRedirectHandler())
+
+
+HTTP_OPENER = build_http_opener()
+
+
 def sha256_text(value: str) -> str:
     return hashlib.sha256(value.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
 
@@ -115,7 +131,7 @@ def request_json(base_url: str, path: str, payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None
         headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
         method="GET" if data is None else "POST",
     )
-    with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
+    with HTTP_OPENER.open(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
         return json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
 
 
@@ -130,7 +146,7 @@ def stream_generate(base_url: str, payload: dict[str, Any], timeout: float) -> t
     first_token_at: float | None = None
     parts: list[str] = []
     final: dict[str, Any] = {}
-    with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
+    with HTTP_OPENER.open(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
         for raw_line in response:
             if not raw_line.strip():
                 continue