feat(auth): add per-account lockout and TOTP 2FA with recovery codes
Adds three layers of account-security hardening, all gated behind the existing SignInWithAppSessionAsync-equivalent (now AppSessionIssuer) so every sign-in path -- local, Google, Microsoft -- goes through the same lockout/2FA checks: - Per-account lockout: Identity's built-in lockout store (columns already provisioned, previously unused) is now wired up in AuthController.Login via IsLockedOutAsync/AccessFailedAsync/ResetAccessFailedCountAsync, 5 failed attempts / 15 min, same generic 401 as wrong-password to avoid enumeration. - RFC 6238 TOTP 2FA (Otp.NET) with QR-code setup (QRCoder, fully local/ offline) on a new TwoFactorController: setup requires password re-confirmation and returns a pending (unconfirmed) secret + QR; the secret is only persisted as active once verify-setup checks a real code. Secrets are encrypted at rest via the same IDataProtector pattern already used for Gmail/Microsoft OAuth refresh tokens. - Login/OAuth exchange now checks TwoFactorEnabled before issuing a real session. If enabled, it hands back an opaque, server-side (IMemoryCache) pending token via a new ITwoFactorPendingTokenService -- deliberately NOT a JWT, so it can never be presented as a bearer token to bypass the 2FA check on any other endpoint. Only POST /api/auth/2fa/challenge can redeem it, rate-limited at 5/5min (tighter than password login, since a 6-digit space is far more brute-forceable). - One-time recovery codes (10 per enable/regenerate, SHA-256-hashed at rest, shown once in plaintext) accepted in the same challenge endpoint as an alternative to a TOTP code. Schema: AspNetUsers gains TotpSecretEncrypted / TotpPendingSecretEncrypted / TotpEnabledAtUtc, plus a new TwoFactorRecoveryCodes table, added to both the SQLite and MySQL dialect blocks in the startup schema reconciler. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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using System.Security.Cryptography;
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using JobTrackerApi.Models;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http;
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namespace JobTrackerApi.Services;
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// Shared by AuthController (local/Google/Microsoft sign-in) and TwoFactorController (the
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// post-challenge sign-in) so the httpOnly session cookie + readable CSRF cookie are always
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// issued the same way, from one place.
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public static class AppSessionIssuer
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{
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public static async Task IssueAsync(HttpRequest request, HttpResponse response, ITokenService tokens, ApplicationUser user, bool rememberMe, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
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{
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var token = await tokens.CreateAccessTokenAsync(user, cancellationToken);
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var secure = request.IsHttps || string.Equals(request.Headers["X-Forwarded-Proto"], "https", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
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response.Cookies.Append(AuthSessionOptions.SessionCookieName, token, AuthSessionOptions.BuildSessionCookie(rememberMe, secure));
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var csrf = Convert.ToHexString(RandomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(32)).ToLowerInvariant();
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response.Cookies.Append(AuthSessionOptions.CsrfCookieName, csrf, AuthSessionOptions.BuildCsrfCookie(rememberMe, secure));
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}
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}
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