docs(security): apply owner-approved root review policy

docs/security-audit/CODEX_SECURITY_SCAN_REGISTER.md

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 # Codex Security scan register
 
+3 November2026 update: owner approved exact root policy creation/publication. Define-security-policy workflow COMPLETED for root policy only; source base88bcd6d9, exact candidate and resolver results in ../security/ROOT_POLICY_APPROVAL.md. Managed standalone artifact ID/path is documented there; there is no scan ID. Root now resolves for API/UI, nested CV-doc policy remains closest. Baseline/deep/final scans below remain NOT RUN/BLOCKED; no charges, active targets or release acceptance approved. Earlier policy-pending entries are historical.
+
 2 November 2026. Source baseline `ba826de1e5c959352e4442ab2fec5d02445dd32d`, branch codex/security-offline-preflight. Owner confirms installation; actual tool metadata/skill files verified. Production/third parties excluded. Paid/deep compute allowance pending. ROE: ../security/00-rules-of-engagement.md.
 
 | Phase/workflow | Status | Actual evidence and limits |

docs/security/ASSESSMENT_INDEX.md

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 # Independent security assessment continuation
 
+3 November2026 — root policy proposal explicitly approved and applied; ROOT_POLICY_APPROVAL.md records exact text identity and successful API/UI/nested policy resolution. This closes the root-policy decision only. Baseline/deep/final scans, current integration target/capability/cost preflight, full matrix and staging/human/release qualifications remain open. No new application/security fix or vulnerability closure is claimed.
+
 Continuation: ATTACHMENT_OWNERSHIP_REVIEW.md traces the parent ownership filter and corrects the reflection-only test assumption. Fourteen existing relational fixture tests freshly passed on identical Phase 10 backend/test sources; native evidence published at db818e5e. Matrix distinguishes direct controller denials from unexecuted HTTP/list/upload/missing-owner/MariaDB checks. No full security scan or final integrated acceptance is implied.
 
 Phase 00 offline preflight, 2 November 2026. Branch `codex/security-offline-preflight`, application baseline `ba826de1e5c959352e4442ab2fec5d02445dd32d`. No application/security implementation changed. No staging attacks or production access.

docs/security/ROOT_POLICY_APPROVAL.md

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+# Root policy approval and resolver verification
+
+3 November2026. Owner explicitly answered **"Approve policy creation and publication"** to the exact41-line SECURITY.md proposal and target in this chat. Approval includes validating the chain and committing/publishing on the security review branch; it does not approve a scan, charge, active testing or production action.
+
+Target was reread and remained absent; HEAD was88bcd6d91c6823ffc6bbc6a6de176ab7769e729f and worktree was clean before creation. Applied text matches the approved candidate exactly after normal newline decoding. Policy LF SHA256: `4ec5365bdc1f84410b596b893463572b035f03d1260f51af722d1c32c8fa3eb3`.
+
+Installed define-security-policy workflow: policy inventory and root/nearest-path guidance reviewed; both existing docs-only policies resolved inside the repository, regular files below1MiB. API had no inherited policy before the change. After creation the actual resolver exited0 for JobTrackerApi and job-tracker-ui with the new root policy, and for docs/cv-import with root plus its existing nearer policy. No inherited policy overwritten. Diff whitespace check passed. No application tests run for this Markdown-only change.
+
+Exact proposal retained through Codex Security managed standalone artifact storage: `artifacts/root-policy-proposal.md`, artifact SHA256 `5d00af57cfa55de2792218916fd9cf646b470d821db6e8afee5c59c76dba116b`, at `C:\Users\Connor\.codex\state\plugins\codex-security\scans\Job-tracker\artifacts-ad2afb630ff68e10e32f349b87541ffb5778071babb98965362c085936a3f385\artifacts\root-policy-proposal.md`. Persistent readback succeeded. This is a standalone document collection, not a scan ID or result.
+
+No new finding exclusion, risk acceptance or severity downgrade. Canonical-profile, tenant, revision, parser/file, AI-consent, provider and recovery invariants remain review requirements, not assertions that all controls already pass. No secret values or private user content read/exported. Source-security and final integrated acceptance remain open.
+
+Next: reconcile the intended immutable integration revision before a baseline scan, finish capability/cost/scope preflight and record actual results. The older offline audit branch is not a final scan of A3 UI changes. Deep allowance and isolated staging remain distinct protected decisions; final integrated scanning follows relevant application changes.