Authentication relied on a fallback policy gated on Auth:Require, which defaults
to false. Five user-owned controllers carried no [Authorize] of their own, so a
deployment that lost that flag would have served tenant data anonymously:
JobApplications, Companies, Correspondence, Rules and JobImport. All five now
declare [Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")] explicitly.
This does not affect local development, which already sets Auth:Require=true in
appsettings.Development.json — the gap was only ever in a production
configuration that omitted the flag.
Added a reflection test over every controller in the assembly so a new one
cannot ship unprotected by accident. A controller passes if the class requires
authorization, or if every action declares its own [Authorize] or
[AllowAnonymous] — the shape AuthController and TwoFactorController need, since
login and register must stay anonymous while the rest must not. Public endpoints
are an explicit allow-list, so making something anonymous is now a deliberate
edit rather than an omission.
That test found one real gap: AuthController.Logout declared neither attribute.
It is now explicitly [AllowAnonymous] — it only clears the caller's own session
cookies and leaks nothing, and requiring authentication would leave a user whose
token had already expired unable to sign out.
Also pinned: admin controllers require the Admin role rather than merely a
signed-in user, and PublicCvController stays anonymous so shared CV links keep
working.
384 backend tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 — Career/Profile separation. The master career profile is the source of
truth; identity and career data are now saved independently so neither wipes the
other. CV Builder deliberately not built yet.
Backend — PUT /auth/profile is now a partial update:
- null/omitted field -> unchanged; "" -> cleared; value -> set (trimmed).
- Email/UserName never cleared to empty (login identifiers).
This lets /profile save identity fields and /career save the master-profile
fields through the same endpoint without one nulling the other. 4 new tests
cover the data-integrity guarantees (identity save keeps the CV, career save
keeps identity, empty clears, null leaves).
Frontend:
- ProfilePage save payload is now scoped by careerOnly: /career sends only
{ profileCvText, profileCvStructureJson }, /profile sends only identity.
- CareerWorkspacePage: removed the inert "CV Builder" tab (careerView) — Phase 2
establishes the master profile only; the builder is Phase 4.
- Dropped the dead careerView prop.
- Updated the CV-save test to render career mode and assert identity is excluded.
Source-of-truth flip (CareerProfileService authoritative) stays deferred to F5
per the branch design; CareerProfileService keeps mirroring via its dual-write.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
JWTs were previously fully stateless -- the token alone was the credential
until its own expiry, with no way to list or kill a session server-side. Add
a UserSession table alongside every JWT issued (AppSessionIssuer), embed its
id as a "sid" claim, and check that claim against the DB on every "local"
scheme request (Program.cs OnTokenValidated) so a session can actually be
revoked before its JWT naturally expires. New /api/auth/sessions endpoints
(list, revoke one, revoke-others) plus a Sessions card on the profile page.
Fails closed on a missing "sid" claim: every JWT issued going forward has
one, so a token without it is either pre-deploy (forces one re-login for
already-signed-in users at deploy time, same additive-forward cost the
2FA/trusted-device work on this branch already paid) or forged.
Auth:RequireEmailVerification (default off) gates whether local
register requires confirming email before login. OAuth new-user paths
are untouched -- Google/Microsoft already assert a verified email.
Adds verify-email and resend-verification-email endpoints, mirroring
the existing reset-password enumeration-avoidance and rate-limiting
patterns, plus a login-embedded resend affordance and a verify-email
landing page on the frontend.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a "trust this device" option to the 2FA challenge: on success, mints a
random token (only its SHA-256 hash is stored), sets it as a new httpOnly,
Secure, SameSite=Strict cookie, and records a TrustedDevice row. AuthController
checks that cookie for the exact signing-in user before gating on 2FA -- a
mismatched user, expired, or revoked device falls through to the normal 2FA
prompt, never errors. TwoFactorController also exposes list/revoke/revoke-all
endpoints for managing trusted devices, scoped to the owning user.
Schema added via the existing raw-SQL reconciler (SQLite + MySQL dialects),
not EF migrations, matching this repo's established pattern.
Adds three layers of account-security hardening, all gated behind the
existing SignInWithAppSessionAsync-equivalent (now AppSessionIssuer) so
every sign-in path -- local, Google, Microsoft -- goes through the same
lockout/2FA checks:
- Per-account lockout: Identity's built-in lockout store (columns already
provisioned, previously unused) is now wired up in AuthController.Login
via IsLockedOutAsync/AccessFailedAsync/ResetAccessFailedCountAsync, 5
failed attempts / 15 min, same generic 401 as wrong-password to avoid
enumeration.
- RFC 6238 TOTP 2FA (Otp.NET) with QR-code setup (QRCoder, fully local/
offline) on a new TwoFactorController: setup requires password
re-confirmation and returns a pending (unconfirmed) secret + QR; the
secret is only persisted as active once verify-setup checks a real
code. Secrets are encrypted at rest via the same IDataProtector pattern
already used for Gmail/Microsoft OAuth refresh tokens.
- Login/OAuth exchange now checks TwoFactorEnabled before issuing a real
session. If enabled, it hands back an opaque, server-side (IMemoryCache)
pending token via a new ITwoFactorPendingTokenService -- deliberately
NOT a JWT, so it can never be presented as a bearer token to bypass the
2FA check on any other endpoint. Only POST /api/auth/2fa/challenge can
redeem it, rate-limited at 5/5min (tighter than password login, since a
6-digit space is far more brute-forceable).
- One-time recovery codes (10 per enable/regenerate, SHA-256-hashed at
rest, shown once in plaintext) accepted in the same challenge endpoint
as an alternative to a TOTP code.
Schema: AspNetUsers gains TotpSecretEncrypted / TotpPendingSecretEncrypted
/ TotpEnabledAtUtc, plus a new TwoFactorRecoveryCodes table, added to both
the SQLite and MySQL dialect blocks in the startup schema reconciler.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wave 7. Mirrors the existing Google ID-token-exchange pattern (Program.cs
smart-scheme dispatch, JWT bearer scheme, AuthController exchange/link/
unlink endpoints, ApplicationUser fields, reconciler columns) for
Microsoft Entra ID + personal accounts via the multi-tenant "common"
endpoint.
Google/Microsoft sign-in previously only worked for accounts already
linked to an existing local user -- there was no way to actually sign
up via OAuth. Both exchange endpoints now create a new user when no
match is found and Auth:AllowRegistration is true, same gate as
email/password registration.
Frontend: new MicrosoftAuthCard (MSAL popup flow -- Microsoft has no
vanilla-JS equivalent to Google's Identity Services script) wired into
the login page's provider tabs and the profile page's account-linking
section. REACT_APP_MICROSOFT_CLIENT_ID env var, Auth:MicrosoftClientId
config gate on the backend.
cesnimda
cesnimda