Adds three layers of account-security hardening, all gated behind the
existing SignInWithAppSessionAsync-equivalent (now AppSessionIssuer) so
every sign-in path -- local, Google, Microsoft -- goes through the same
lockout/2FA checks:
- Per-account lockout: Identity's built-in lockout store (columns already
provisioned, previously unused) is now wired up in AuthController.Login
via IsLockedOutAsync/AccessFailedAsync/ResetAccessFailedCountAsync, 5
failed attempts / 15 min, same generic 401 as wrong-password to avoid
enumeration.
- RFC 6238 TOTP 2FA (Otp.NET) with QR-code setup (QRCoder, fully local/
offline) on a new TwoFactorController: setup requires password
re-confirmation and returns a pending (unconfirmed) secret + QR; the
secret is only persisted as active once verify-setup checks a real
code. Secrets are encrypted at rest via the same IDataProtector pattern
already used for Gmail/Microsoft OAuth refresh tokens.
- Login/OAuth exchange now checks TwoFactorEnabled before issuing a real
session. If enabled, it hands back an opaque, server-side (IMemoryCache)
pending token via a new ITwoFactorPendingTokenService -- deliberately
NOT a JWT, so it can never be presented as a bearer token to bypass the
2FA check on any other endpoint. Only POST /api/auth/2fa/challenge can
redeem it, rate-limited at 5/5min (tighter than password login, since a
6-digit space is far more brute-forceable).
- One-time recovery codes (10 per enable/regenerate, SHA-256-hashed at
rest, shown once in plaintext) accepted in the same challenge endpoint
as an alternative to a TOTP code.
Schema: AspNetUsers gains TotpSecretEncrypted / TotpPendingSecretEncrypted
/ TotpEnabledAtUtc, plus a new TwoFactorRecoveryCodes table, added to both
the SQLite and MySQL dialect blocks in the startup schema reconciler.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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