c0bf69ad56
Authentication relied on a fallback policy gated on Auth:Require, which defaults to false. Five user-owned controllers carried no [Authorize] of their own, so a deployment that lost that flag would have served tenant data anonymously: JobApplications, Companies, Correspondence, Rules and JobImport. All five now declare [Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")] explicitly. This does not affect local development, which already sets Auth:Require=true in appsettings.Development.json — the gap was only ever in a production configuration that omitted the flag. Added a reflection test over every controller in the assembly so a new one cannot ship unprotected by accident. A controller passes if the class requires authorization, or if every action declares its own [Authorize] or [AllowAnonymous] — the shape AuthController and TwoFactorController need, since login and register must stay anonymous while the rest must not. Public endpoints are an explicit allow-list, so making something anonymous is now a deliberate edit rather than an omission. That test found one real gap: AuthController.Logout declared neither attribute. It is now explicitly [AllowAnonymous] — it only clears the caller's own session cookies and leaks nothing, and requiring authentication would leave a user whose token had already expired unable to sign out. Also pinned: admin controllers require the Admin role rather than merely a signed-in user, and PublicCvController stays anonymous so shared CV links keep working. 384 backend tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
127 lines
5.5 KiB
C#
127 lines
5.5 KiB
C#
using System.Reflection;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc;
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using Xunit;
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namespace JobTrackerApi.Tests;
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// Authorization posture, asserted by reflection over every controller in the assembly.
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//
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// The point is that a NEW controller cannot ship unprotected by accident. Authentication used to rely
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// on the Auth:Require fallback policy, which defaults to false — a deployment that lost that flag
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// would have served tenant data anonymously. Every controller must now declare its intent.
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// docs/production-readiness-review.md.
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public sealed class ApiAuthorizationPostureTests
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{
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// Endpoints that are anonymous ON PURPOSE. Adding to this list is a deliberate security decision.
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private static readonly HashSet<string> IntentionallyAnonymous = new(StringComparer.Ordinal)
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{
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// Serves /cv/{slug} for variants the user explicitly published. Noindex by default.
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"PublicCvController",
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// Accepts browser error reports. Must work on pages reached before sign-in.
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"ClientErrorsController",
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};
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// Property accessors and object overrides are not endpoints.
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private static bool IsEndpoint(MethodInfo m) => !(
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m.IsSpecialName || m.DeclaringType == typeof(object));
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private static IEnumerable<Type> Controllers() =>
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typeof(JobTrackerApi.Controllers.ApplicationWorkspaceController).Assembly
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.GetTypes()
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.Where(t => typeof(ControllerBase).IsAssignableFrom(t) && !t.IsAbstract);
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// A controller is covered if the CLASS requires authorization, or if every action declares its own
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// intent. AuthController and TwoFactorController are necessarily mixed — login and register must be
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// anonymous while the rest are not — so they mark each method individually.
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private static bool DeclaresIntent(Type controller)
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{
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if (controller.GetCustomAttribute<AuthorizeAttribute>(inherit: true) is not null) return true;
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var actions = controller
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.GetMethods(BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Instance | BindingFlags.DeclaredOnly)
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.Where(IsEndpoint)
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.ToList();
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return actions.Count > 0 && actions.All(m =>
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m.GetCustomAttribute<AuthorizeAttribute>(inherit: true) is not null ||
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m.GetCustomAttribute<AllowAnonymousAttribute>(inherit: true) is not null);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Every_controller_either_requires_authorization_or_is_listed_as_public()
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{
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var unprotected = Controllers()
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.Where(t => !IntentionallyAnonymous.Contains(t.Name))
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.Where(t => !DeclaresIntent(t))
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.Select(t => t.Name)
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.OrderBy(name => name, StringComparer.Ordinal)
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.ToList();
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Assert.True(
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unprotected.Count == 0,
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"These controllers declare no authorization intent — neither on the class nor on every "
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+ "action — so they would be served anonymously if Auth:Require were ever false: "
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+ string.Join(", ", unprotected));
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Every_action_on_the_mixed_auth_controllers_declares_its_own_intent()
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{
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// Sign-in surfaces are the easiest place to add an endpoint and forget to mark it.
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foreach (var name in new[] { "AuthController", "TwoFactorController" })
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{
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var type = Controllers().Single(t => t.Name == name);
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var undeclared = type
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.GetMethods(BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Instance | BindingFlags.DeclaredOnly)
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.Where(IsEndpoint)
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.Where(m => m.GetCustomAttribute<AuthorizeAttribute>(inherit: true) is null
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&& m.GetCustomAttribute<AllowAnonymousAttribute>(inherit: true) is null)
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.Select(m => m.Name)
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.ToList();
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Assert.True(undeclared.Count == 0,
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$"{name} has actions with neither [Authorize] nor [AllowAnonymous]: {string.Join(", ", undeclared)}");
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}
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}
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[Fact]
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public void The_user_owned_controllers_that_used_to_rely_on_the_fallback_policy_are_now_explicit()
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{
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// These five were the actual gap found in the Phase 5.6 audit.
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foreach (var name in new[]
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{
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"JobApplicationsController", "CompaniesController", "CorrespondenceController",
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"RulesController", "JobImportController",
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})
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{
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var type = Controllers().Single(t => t.Name == name);
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var attribute = type.GetCustomAttribute<AuthorizeAttribute>(inherit: true);
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Assert.True(attribute is not null, $"{name} must declare [Authorize].");
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Assert.Equal("local", attribute!.AuthenticationSchemes);
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}
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Admin_controllers_require_the_admin_role_not_merely_a_signed_in_user()
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{
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foreach (var name in new[] { "AdminAuditController", "AdminSystemController", "UsersController" })
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{
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var type = Controllers().Single(t => t.Name == name);
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var attribute = type.GetCustomAttribute<AuthorizeAttribute>(inherit: true);
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Assert.True(attribute is not null, $"{name} must declare [Authorize].");
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Assert.Equal("Admin", attribute!.Roles);
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}
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}
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[Fact]
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public void The_public_cv_controller_stays_anonymous()
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{
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// Regression guard in the other direction: locking this down would break every shared CV link.
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var type = Controllers().Single(t => t.Name == "PublicCvController");
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Assert.Null(type.GetCustomAttribute<AuthorizeAttribute>(inherit: true));
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}
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}
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