Files
jobtrackingapp/docs/release-candidate-review.md
T
cesnimda 66b02bcab8 fix(deploy): load production environment before backup
deploy.sh symlinked /opt/job-tracker/shared/.env for docker compose but
never loaded it into its own shell. Its own decisions therefore ran
against an empty environment: DATABASE_PROVIDER fell back to sqlite on a
MariaDB host, so the deploy tarred the data volume, printed "Backup
verified" and continued with no database dump. The operator saw a green
backup line and a new file in the backups directory, and had no restore
point.

Load the shared env before any decision. Parsed line by line rather than
sourced, because a compose .env is not a shell script and an unquoted
value containing spaces would execute as a command. Values already in
the environment win, so CI-provided APP_VERSION and friends still
override the file. No value is echoed.

Remove the sqlite default. DATABASE_PROVIDER must be stated; missing or
unrecognised aborts the deploy.

Validate deployment configuration before the backup, and so before
anything is built, stopped or replaced: the connection string when the
provider needs one, AI_SERVICE_TOKEN (compose declares it with :?) and
AUTH_JWT_KEY (the backend throws on a blank key). Names in the output,
never values.

Verify each backup against its own format. A dump must be valid gzip,
contain CREATE TABLE, and carry the "Dump completed" trailer, so a dump
that died partway through is rejected. An archive must contain
jobtracker.db. A tar can no longer pass the dump check.

Also resolve the SQLite volume by its project-prefixed name and fail if
absent. The bare jobtracker_data name would have silently created an
empty volume and backed that up -- the same class of bug, found while
testing this fix.

Verified against a seeded MariaDB 11 container and real Docker volumes:
provider selection, all four validation failures, both backup formats
and their failure paths, truncated and trailer-stripped dumps, and zero
secret occurrences across every test's output.

Docs updated for the drift: deploy/README.md, deploy/first-production-
deployment.md, docs/release-candidate-review.md (B1 closed) and
.env.example, which now names the two database variables.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 18:44:23 +02:00

18 KiB

Release candidate review

2026-07-19. Final validation pass before the first production deployment. No application code was changed by this review — findings only. Every claim below was checked against the implementation, not against the other documents. Where a document and the code disagreed, the code is reported.

Companions: deploy/first-production-deployment.md (how to deploy), docs/production-readiness-review.md (what was audited), docs/infrastructure/database-ownership.md (who creates which table), docs/release-checklist.md (state of the build).

Updated 2026-07-19 (second pass). B1 is fixed and verifieddeploy.sh now loads the shared environment before it decides anything, requires DATABASE_PROVIDER explicitly, validates the rest of the deployment configuration before touching the stack, and verifies each backup against its own format. Details under Blocking.

Verdict: one blocking item remains — CI (B2), which is external. The deployment path itself is now sound.


Ready

Database

Item Verified against
Startup order is connect → reconcile → Migrate() → reconcile → seed StartupInitializationExtensions.InitializeJobTrackerAsync; matches database-ownership.md exactly
Migration ownership Companies, JobApplications, Jobs, Correspondences, Attachments, JobEvents, RuleSettings, Identity — created only by migrations; reconciler repairs but never CREATE TABLEs them
Reconciler ownership Every Phase 4/5 table is reconciler-owned with a paired no-op migration holding the snapshot. The seven no-op migrations named in database-ownership.md all exist on disk
Dependency guards Reconciler tables with an FK are guarded on the parent existing, so pass 1 skips and pass 2 creates. EnsureMySqlIndex guards on table existence, not just index existence
Reconciler is non-destructive DropMalformedMySqlTable checks row count first and skips any table holding rows
Provider selection accepts both spellings Program.cs:68provider is "mysql" or "mariadb". deploy/README.md documents DATABASE_PROVIDER=mariadb; that value works
Rollback reasoning is sound Phase 4/5 migrations are no-ops, so reverting code never leaves migration history ahead of the schema. Older code ignores the extra tables

Security

Item Verified against
Explicit authorization Every user-owned controller carries a class-level [Authorize(AuthenticationSchemes = "local")]. Confirmed directly on JobApplicationsController, CompaniesController, CorrespondenceController, RulesController, AttachmentsController, BackupController, ExportController
Independent of Auth:Require The FallbackPolicy at Program.cs:380 is additional, not the only defence. /api/jobapplications returns 401 with Auth:Require unset
Anonymous surface is a deliberate allow-list PublicCvController (class-level [AllowAnonymous]), ClientErrorsController, /health, and per-method anonymity on AuthController / TwoFactorController / the two OAuth callbacks
OAuth callbacks are not an open door GmailController.Callback and MicrosoftGraphController.Callback are anonymous by necessity but gated on ConsumeState(state); an unknown or replayed state is rejected before any token exchange
Tenant isolation 25 global query filters, all deny-on-null (CurrentUserId != null && OwnerUserId == CurrentUserId), covering every owner-scoped root entity
Attachments are tenant-scoped and path-safe Resolved through the parent JobApplication query (so the job-level filter applies); stored names go through Path.GetFileName + BuildStoredFileName, so a crafted upload name cannot escape the attachments root
AI service is not reachable from outside ai-service is on ai_internal only — not on default, not on the external shared_services, no published port. Backend is the only member that can route to it
AI service authenticates its caller X-Ai-Service-Token middleware with hmac.compare_digest; only /health is open. Compose declares the token with :? so a deploy that forgets it fails loudly
Public CV is opt-in Off by default, per-variant, unguessable slug, noindex
Secrets not committed .env is gitignored (.gitignore:8); nothing sensitive tracked
Backup handles the password safely MYSQL_PWD, never on the command line, so it cannot reach the process list or the deploy log. Dump stderr is scrubbed before it is echoed

Application integrity — architecture rules

Rule Verified
CareerProfile is the only editable career source The two Phase 5 services that touch CareerProfilesApplicationChecklistService:343 and ApplicationIntelligenceService:199 — both read AsNoTracking(). Nothing downstream writes to it
CvVariant is a derived lens ApplicationAssetsService.AttachVariantAsync writes only JobApplicationId and UpdatedAtUtc. Attaching a CV to an application never touches variant content
Application Workspace aggregates only ApplicationIntelligenceService and ApplicationTimelineService contain zero SaveChanges calls. They are pure projections
JobEvent is the timeline source of truth ApplicationTimelineService interprets JobEvent rows and stores nothing. Emission is centralised in JobLifecycleEvents
AI is suggestion-only Generation appends to AiInteraction; nothing is written to a profile, variant, cover letter or prep item without an explicit user save

Deployment

Item Verified
CI gates deployment deploy job declares needs: test and if: push && ref == refs/heads/main
Deploy is pinned to the tested commit The remote script git reset --hard ${{ github.sha }} and aborts if that commit is not fetchable
Container dependency ordering frontend declares depends_on: backend: condition: service_healthy. A backend that never reports healthy makes compose up fail, and set -e aborts the deploy — a broken backend cannot present as a running stack
Health checks exist on both services curl against /health for backend (90s start period, covering first-boot reconciliation), wget against nginx for frontend
/health does not touch the database Deliberate: a DB-querying probe would restart a healthy backend on any database blip, and would hand out an unauthenticated way to probe database availability
Missing AI_SERVICE_TOKEN fails the stack ${AI_SERVICE_TOKEN:?…} in compose, on both backend and ai-service
Missing AUTH_JWT_KEY fails the backend With Auth__Require=true, Program.cs:241 throws InvalidOperationException. It does not silently generate an ephemeral key
Backup rejects a useless dump verify_backup fails the deploy on an empty file, and on a MariaDB dump lacking CREATE TABLE
Backups never overwrite UTC-timestamped filenames; retention is explicitly manual and the script says so
Test suite 393 backend tests pass in Release, run for this review

Blocking

B1. The pre-deploy database backup does not back up the databaseCLOSED 2026-07-19

Original finding, kept because the failure mode is worth understanding:

Severity: critical. This invalidates the restore point that the entire deployment plan depends on.

deploy/deploy.sh symlinks /opt/job-tracker/shared/.env into the checkout so that docker compose can read it. It never sources it. There is no set -a, no . .env, no export of the database variables anywhere in the script.

So the script's own shell evaluates:

local provider="${DATABASE_PROVIDER:-sqlite}"

DATABASE_PROVIDER is not set in that shell. The CI deploy step exports only APP_VERSION, APP_COMMIT_SHA and APP_BUILD_STAMP, and a non-interactive ssh session does not read a profile. provider resolves to sqlite on a MariaDB production host.

The consequence is not a loud failure, which is what makes this serious:

  1. The SQLite branch runs and tars the jobtracker_data volume.
  2. That volume exists in production (the backend mounts it for /data, exports and attachments), so the tar succeeds and produces a non-empty file.
  3. verify_backup is called without the CREATE TABLE expectation on this path — it only checks the file is non-empty.
  4. The script prints Backup verified: … and the deploy proceeds.

The operator sees a green backup line and a new file in /opt/job-tracker/backups. There is no MariaDB dump. If the deploy then damages the schema, there is nothing to restore.

Same root cause, two further silent effects:

  • APP_PUBLIC_BASE_URL is likewise unset, so the public smoke check at the end of deploy.sh never runs. deploy/first-production-deployment.md states it does.
  • OLLAMA_MODEL is unset, so the post-deploy Ollama warmup never runs.

How to confirm before trusting any fix: run the deploy and check that the newest file in /opt/job-tracker/backups is named jobtracker-<dbname>-<stamp>.sql.gz, not jobtracker-sqlite-<stamp>.tar.gz. The filename alone distinguishes the two paths.

Closed. deploy/deploy.sh now:

  1. Loads /opt/job-tracker/shared/.env into its own shell before any decision. Parsed line by line rather than sourced, because a compose .env is not a shell script. Variables already set in the environment win, so CI-provided APP_VERSION and friends still override the file. No value is echoed.
  2. Requires DATABASE_PROVIDER explicitly. The :-sqlite default is gone. Missing means stop and say which variable is missing; an unrecognised value means stop.
  3. Validates the rest of the deployment configuration before the backup, and therefore before anything is built, stopped or replaced: the connection string when the provider needs one, AI_SERVICE_TOKEN (compose declares it with :?, so missing it would otherwise kill the stack after the images are built) and AUTH_JWT_KEY (the backend throws at startup on a blank key, after the containers have been replaced). Names only in the output, never values.
  4. Verifies each backup against its own format. A MariaDB dump must be valid gzip, contain CREATE TABLE, and carry the Dump completed trailer that mariadb-dump writes last — so a dump that died partway through is rejected. A SQLite archive must be valid gzip and actually contain jobtracker.db. A tar can no longer pass the dump check, which is precisely what went wrong.
  5. Resolves the SQLite volume by its real, project-prefixed name and fails if it does not exist. The old code named the bare jobtracker_data, which on a real deploy would have silently created an empty volume and backed that up — a second instance of the same class of bug, found while testing the fix.

Two side effects of the same root cause are also resolved: APP_PUBLIC_BASE_URL now reaches the script, so the post-deploy public smoke check actually runs (and the script says so explicitly when it is unset rather than skipping in silence), as does OLLAMA_MODEL for the warmup.

Verified against a seeded MariaDB 11 container and real Docker volumes:

Scenario Result
MariaDB production-style .env env loaded, MariaDB path selected, .sql.gz written containing CREATE TABLE, the seeded row, and the Dump completed trailer
DATABASE_PROVIDER missing exits 1 naming the variable; nothing built, stopped or replaced; no backup file
DATABASE_PROVIDER unrecognised exits 1
AI_SERVICE_TOKEN / AUTH_JWT_KEY missing both reported in one pass, exits 1
SQLite with a populated volume .tar.gz written and verified
SQLite volume containing no jobtracker.db rejected, file deleted
SQLite volume name not present rejected before any container ran; no stray empty volume created
Broken database credentials exits 1, no partial file left behind
Truncated dump (no CREATE TABLE) rejected
Dump with the trailer stripped rejected as truncated
Secret leakage across every test's output zero occurrences of any password, token or key

B2. CI is red — deployment is gated on it

Unchanged and still external to the repository. Commit 8f73548 changed one markdown file and its test job failed in the same duration band as every other run; a change that cannot affect compilation cannot fail a test job. The deploy job declares needs: test, so nothing promotes until this clears.

Everything in this review is therefore local verification. Blocked on job logs (a read-scoped Gitea token), journalctl -u act_runner, and the runner container configuration. Evidence in docs/infrastructure/runner-investigation.md.


Non-blocking

Known and accepted for the first release. None of these should stop a deploy; all are worth knowing.

# Finding Why it is not blocking
N1 .env.example omits DATABASE_PROVIDER and JOBTRACKER_CONNECTION_STRINGCLOSED 2026-07-19 Both added to the template with the connection-string host caveat. deploy.sh now hard-fails without DATABASE_PROVIDER, so the template had to name it
N2 /health always reports "version":"unknown" under Docker — the endpoint reads the APP_VERSION environment variable, but compose passes it as App__Version Liveness is unaffected; only the version string is wrong. deploy/first-production-deployment.md shows a populated version in its expected output, which will not match reality
N3 The post-deploy gate in deploy.sh checks .State == running, not health — a container can be running while starting or unhealthy Harmless in practice: compose up already blocks on service_healthy for the frontend's dependency, so an unhealthy backend aborts the deploy before this check is reached. The check is weaker than it looks, not wrong
N4 Table-count discrepancy across documentsdatabase-ownership.md records 40 tables on MariaDB; release-checklist.md and the runbook say ~42 Both were measured, at different points in Phase 5. Use "the tables listed in database-ownership.md all exist" as the check, not a number
N5 ai-service opens completely if AI_SERVICE_TOKEN is the empty string — the middleware is if AI_SERVICE_TOKEN and …, so a blank token disables the check rather than failing closed Compose declares the variable with :? on both services, so the stack refuses to start without it. No defence in depth behind that, though
N6 Logging is console-only Captured by docker logs; adequate for a single-node self-hosted deployment. No retention, structure or aggregation
N7 No global exception handler Unhandled errors return a bare 500 with no correlation id. No stack traces leak outside Development, so this is a supportability cost, not a security one
N8 ClientErrorsController is anonymous By design — browser error reports must work on pages reached before sign-in. Size-limited to 32 KB and field-truncated; stores nothing
N9 A code rollback does not recover rows written to the new tables Correct and documented. A code rollback loses nothing; only a database restore discards checklist items, cover letter versions, interview prep and AI history created since the dump
N10 Prompt quality is unmeasured Interview generation now receives analysis and match context. Whether the output is better is a judgement no test makes

Manual verification required

Only the owner can do these. Nothing in this review, and nothing in the test suite, covers any of them — every automated check stops at the authentication boundary.

Before deploying

  • Take a MariaDB dump by hand and restore it into a scratch database. B1 is fixed and the automatic backup is verified against containers, but the first production deploy is still the wrong moment to discover that a backup does not restore on your data.
  • Confirm /opt/job-tracker/shared/.env contains DATABASE_PROVIDER=mariadb and JOBTRACKER_CONNECTION_STRING. deploy.sh now aborts without them, so a missing value costs an aborted deploy rather than a bad backup — but check first and skip the round trip.
  • Confirm the connection-string host resolves from inside the backend container127.0.0.1 there means the container, not the Docker host.
  • After the deploy, check the backup filename. It must be jobtracker-<database>-<stamp>.sql.gz. A jobtracker-sqlite-<stamp>.tar.gz means the environment is wrong — though the provider check should now stop that before it happens.
  • Record the current commit (git rev-parse HEAD) and the current row counts for JobApplications and Companies. The row counts are the check that matters most afterwards.

After deploying

  • Login with a real existing account. Requires a password; no automated step here handles one.
  • Existing user data intact — application and company counts match the pre-deploy numbers exactly, and applications open with their real content.
  • CV builder loads an existing variant, including via an application deep link (/career/builder/:id).
  • Application workspace renders — Overview, Checklist, Timeline, Analysis, Match. New sections being empty on existing applications is correct, not a fault.
  • Public CV resolves at /cv/<slug> for a variant already marked public, including on refresh and from a shared link.
  • An AI generation completes end to end and writes nothing until you save it.
  • Email and calendar integrations still connect, if you use them — the OAuth callbacks were reviewed statically but never exercised against live Google or Microsoft.
  • The full journey once, deliberately — empty profile through to a recorded outcome. No one has walked it. Friction in that path is currently unmapped.