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docs(discovery): add product blueprint + multi-provider platform design
World-class discovery specification (design phase, no code):
- Executive summary, architecture review, competitor + user research
- UX/UI redesign + design system + themes, flagship search redesign
- AI strategy (local Ollama, RTX 3080) + feature catalogue
- Technical architecture, roadmap (MVP->v3), git plan, risks
- Multi-provider platform: IEmailProvider abstraction, OAuth-as-login,
  unified DB schema, settings + feature flags, admin/RBAC, security model,
  6-phase implementation plan, migration guide

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 19:41:40 +02:00

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# 11 — Risk Analysis
Risks specific to the multi-provider + multi-user + admin evolution (the blueprint-wide risks
are in [../11](../11-risks-and-future.md)). L/I = Likelihood/Impact (H/M/L).
| # | Risk | L | I | Mitigation |
|---|------|---|---|------------|
| M1 | **Account-linking hijack** (attach someone's mailbox to your user) | L | H | Must authenticate as the target user; unique `(provider, sub)`; explicit "already owned" block; audited ([02](02-auth-and-signin.md)) |
| M2 | **Cross-user data leakage** (multi-user IDOR) | M | H | EF global query filters on `user_id`/`account_id`; policy-based authz; no admin route reads user mail; tests for isolation |
| M3 | **OAuth token theft / exposure** | L | H | Encrypted at rest (Data Protection); never logged or sent to browser; rotation; `bytea` ciphertext |
| M4 | **Provider quirks break sync** (Graph delta resets, IMAP `UIDVALIDITY` change, Gmail history gaps) | M | M | Per-provider cursor handling with **full-resync fallback**; idempotent upserts; capability flags; account flips to needs-attention, never crashes |
| M5 | **Migration corrupts existing Gmail data** | L | H | Additive-only schema; backfill is idempotent; maintenance window; tested on a staging copy; reversible ([12](12-migration-guide.md)) |
| M6 | **RBAC bug grants Member admin powers** | L | H | Server-side policies (not UI); admin-only role changes audited + force session refresh; can't demote last Admin; authz tests |
| M7 | **Feature-flag misconfiguration** (AI/provider on when not ready) | M | M | Flags default **off/fail-closed**; land dark; enable in staging first; audited toggles; rollout by role |
| M8 | **AI gate bypass** (feature runs when disabled) | L | M | Single `IAiGate` chokepoint before any AI call; Null providers; capability checks; no direct provider refs in core |
| M9 | **Session/CSRF weaknesses** across new surfaces | M | M | Server-side sessions, id rotation, SameSite + CSRF token, revoke-all, short idle expiry |
| M10 | **Admin abuse / mistake** (mass suspend, wrong flag) | M | M | Step-up confirm + rate-limit + full audit trail + reversible flags |
| M11 | **Scaling: millions of msgs × multiple accounts** | M | M | Denormalised `user_id`, keyset pagination, GIN/trgm/HNSW indexes, optional `account_id` partitioning, per-account sync throttling |
| M12 | **Provider OAuth app setup burden** (separate Google + Microsoft app registrations, redirect URIs, verification) | M | L | Documented setup per provider; providers flag-gated so an unconfigured one is simply hidden |
| M13 | **Scope/verification friction** (Google restricted scopes, MS admin consent) | M | M | Least-privilege scopes; document the consent/verification path; self-host uses the operator's own OAuth apps |
## Top watch-items
- **M2 (isolation)** and **M6 (RBAC)** — the two ways multi-user can go wrong; both mitigated
by server-side authz + query filters + isolation tests as a release gate.
- **M4 (provider sync quirks)** — the most likely *operational* pain; the full-resync fallback
and per-account isolation contain it.
## Overall
The flag-gated, additive, isolated design makes this evolution **low-blast-radius**: each
provider and the AI layer land dark and roll back by flag, migrations are additive, and the
security model closes the new multi-user gaps. Proceed **phase by phase behind flags**.