docs(security): trace attachment owner filters to relational proof

docs/security-audit/CODEX_SECURITY_SCAN_REGISTER.md

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+# Codex Security scan register
+
+2 November 2026. Source baseline `ba826de1e5c959352e4442ab2fec5d02445dd32d`, branch codex/security-offline-preflight. Owner confirms installation; actual tool metadata/skill files verified. Production/third parties excluded. Paid/deep compute allowance pending. ROE: ../security/00-rules-of-engagement.md.
+
+| Phase/workflow | Status | Actual evidence and limits |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| 00 define-security-policy review | NOT RUN (full workflow); resolver substep COMPLETED | Installed helper resolve-security-md --list exited 0, returned two docs-only policies. No root policy created; proposal/review/approval remains. No scan ID. |
+| 01 baseline standard scan | NOT RUN | Skill/tool exposure checked; threat-model/policy and capability preflight pending. No scan artifacts or findings. |
+| 03 deep scan | BLOCKED | Baseline and separately approved compute/cost scope missing. No scan launched. |
+| 15 final standard and diff scans | NOT RUN | Await baseline, remediation range and independent verification. |
+
+No scan findings, closure verdicts or human release acceptance are implied by tool availability or regression tests.

docs/security/00-rules-of-engagement.md

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+# Security Phase 00 — offline engagement draft
+
+2 November 2026. Owner: Connor, direct-chat roadmap authorisation. Source baseline `ba826de1e5c959352e4442ab2fec5d02445dd32d`; isolated branch `codex/security-offline-preflight`. Phase 00 is PARTIAL, not accepted.
+
+Authorised now: source inspection, harmless synthetic local fixtures, minimal ordinary remediation within approved roadmap boundaries, sanitized reports and branch publication. No network attack target has been approved. Production, adjacent LAN services, real accounts/data, identity/payment/email providers, live AI/models, orchestrator state/keys/configuration/queue and the pre-P10 acceptance worktree are excluded.
+
+Active staging testing is BLOCKED until exact host/IP, test users/roles, rate/concurrency/duration limits, independent database/storage, disabled egress and recovery/stop controls are approved and verified. Do not infer those from example localhost URLs or repository credentials. Emergency stop: terminate only the named audit-owned fixture process; never stop existing production/user services.
+
+Proposed fixture boundary: disposable synthetic tenant A, tenant B and administrator; separate temporary data root and database; inert CV files and canary records; mocked OAuth, billing, email, job providers and AI. No routable credentials. Snapshot and restore qualification must precede staged mutation. This plan has not been instantiated or approved for active network testing.
+
+Evidence: only sanitized reports/test artifacts in Git. Do not inspect real .env values, auth/signing stores or personal documents. Findings require calibrated confidence and safe reproduction; absence of a scan result proves nothing. No root SECURITY.md policy edits, suppressed findings or accepted risks are authorised by this draft.

docs/security/01-threat-model.md

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+# Phase 01 — partial source-backed threat model
+
+2 November 2026, baseline ba826de1e5c959352e4442ab2fec5d02445dd32d. PARTIAL; baseline scan NOT RUN. Read the complete Phase 01 prompt and architecture frontend/backend/data-flow/integrations, API reference, security notes and deployment overview. The graph query failed because the new isolated worktree has no graph; direct scoped source review followed. No active network request or live-service test.
+
+Verified dependency and documented data-flow inventory is in ASSESSMENT_INDEX.md. Threat actors to test: anonymous caller, tenant A, tenant B, administrator, revoked/limited session, malicious document author, incoming webhook sender and compromised external service. Assets: canonical career profile and history, CV/letter snapshots, application records, attachments, OAuth/mail tokens, sessions, billing entitlements, backups and administrative privileges. Secret values have not been inspected.
+
+Source boundary observations (not proof of a secure deployment):
+
+- AttachmentsController requires the local authentication scheme. List first queries the requested job; download/rename call FindOwnedAttachmentAsync. Downloads reject unmanaged paths and pending/missing files. Global filter/helper implementation, alternate upload paths and negative tests still need independent audit.
+- UsersController declares Admin role authorization. Role mutation and reset/email operations require endpoint-specific review; class attributes alone do not establish safe privilege transitions.
+- BillingController status/checkout/portal explicitly use local authentication; webhook explicitly allows anonymous requests and caps request size at 1 MB. Webhook verifies the Stripe signature via ConstructEvent, rejects invalid signatures, then refreshes subscription state. This can trigger external Stripe egress when configured; do not execute it against a real provider during offline tests. Review identity binding, replay, price qualification and mock negative coverage before acceptance.
+
+Initial attack tree: reach another tenant's data via object IDs, background execution or shared files; obtain higher privilege via role/session/OAuth flows; cross file/network/model boundaries through uploaded content; forge billing authority through webhook or stale subscription state; expose secrets through public bundles/logs/backups. Each branch requires source tracing plus synthetic negative proof. These are hypotheses, not confirmed vulnerabilities.
+
+ASVS Level 2 is a proposed planning target for private employment data, not a compliance claim. No unverified requirement IDs or vulnerability identifiers are assigned. Partial endpoint matrix is ENDPOINT_AUTH_MATRIX.csv; tests listed there are candidate existing suites, NOT executed audit evidence. Full route enumeration, middleware/global filter review, deployed exposure and complete endpoint/test mapping remain open.
+
+Next permitted review: resolve owner filters and attachment sibling paths, inspect auth/session middleware, and complete the source matrix. Baseline standard scan requires the documented capability preflight and recorded results; no scan pass is inferred from this threat model. Root policy changes, if proposed, require exact-diff approval under the policy skill; keep review-only work progressing meanwhile.

docs/security/ASSESSMENT_INDEX.md

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+# Independent security assessment continuation
+
+Continuation: ATTACHMENT_OWNERSHIP_REVIEW.md traces the parent ownership filter and corrects the reflection-only test assumption. Fourteen existing relational fixture tests freshly passed on identical Phase 10 backend/test sources; native evidence published at db818e5e. Matrix distinguishes direct controller denials from unexecuted HTTP/list/upload/missing-owner/MariaDB checks. No full security scan or final integrated acceptance is implied.
+
+Phase 00 offline preflight, 2 November 2026. Branch `codex/security-offline-preflight`, application baseline `ba826de1e5c959352e4442ab2fec5d02445dd32d`. No application/security implementation changed. No staging attacks or production access.
+
+Read the external master, complete Phase 00 prompt, ROE/finding/release/scan-register templates, repository auditor skill, Codex Security policy and standard-scan skill instructions. Remaining stage prompts must be read before entering their stages. The old master heading “DO NOT START THIS NOW” is superseded for permitted offline work by the owner's later direct execution instruction; protected gates remain.
+
+Verified inventory: package.json identifies Next 16.4.1, React 19/MUI/TypeScript; API csproj targets .NET 9 with EF SQLite and Pomelo MariaDB, Identity/JWT, Stripe, MailKit; Python requirements identify FastAPI/transformers/document dependencies. These are source dependencies, not deployed identities or proven reachable features. Architecture overview documents nginx/static export -> API -> DB/files/internal AI and provider boundaries; runtime exposure remains unverified. Preserve canonical Career Profile, CV null-as-inherit overrides, letter history and JobApplication.Version/RD21 contracts. No technology-version vulnerability claim is made without advisory/reachability analysis.
+
+Baseline evidence reused from this exact source ancestry: P10-04 has 89 backend and 92 frontend tests passing, independently source-bound native artifacts. CLEAN-20 has five focused browser checks plus type/lint/build evidence. These are regression evidence, not a completed security audit; this new worktree did not rerun them. Backup parser repair exists on a separate published branch and is not integrated here.
+
+Plugin exposure: standard/deep scan, draft/artifact/progress tools and documented skill files are available. The actual policy resolver ran successfully and found only docs/cv-import/SECURITY.md and docs/redesign/phase-9/p9-requal-01/SECURITY.md. Neither is an inherited root policy for API/UI source. No baseline/deep scan has run. Root policy creation needs exact proposed diff and separate owner approval under define-security-policy; defer that decision while independent source review continues. No new charge approved; deep scan remains blocked.
+
+Execution order: finish inventory/threat boundaries and baseline policy review; standard scan after required preflight/gates; deep scan only with cost scope; phases 02–12 offline review/fixture work in source order; active phase 13 only with approved isolated target; remediation and independent retest; final full standard/diff scans; human release gate. Read every applicable subordinate prompt before its work. Do not treat these milestones as complete based on this plan.
+
+Open: approved ROE/staging isolation, complete trust-boundary/endpoint matrix, root policy decision, baseline/final scans, deep-scan allowance, full independent audit, provider/device/CI/deployment identity and live backup/restore. Security release recommendation: BLOCKED/NO-GO pending evidence. No new vulnerability has been asserted in Phase 00.
+
+Next permitted action: read Phase 01 and the linked architecture topics, verify endpoint/actor boundaries from source, and prepare the policy proposal without writing an unapproved root policy. No user input is immediately required for that review.

docs/security/ATTACHMENT_OWNERSHIP_REVIEW.md

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+# Attachment ownership follow-through
+
+2 November 2026. Source review plus bounded existing relational fixtures; not complete Phase 05, integrated security testing or deployed acceptance.
+
+AttachmentsController.FindOwnedAttachmentAsync:42–47 includes JobApplication while selecting the raw child ID. JobTrackerContext:169–170 denies missing owners and filters JobApplication by CurrentUserId; the Attachment relation at 264–268 uses the parent foreign key. Attachment itself does not have a separate owner filter. Download, Rename and Delete all call this helper. ListForJob first checks the owned JobApplication exists, then limits child rows to that ID. Maintain these relationships; raw child queries without equivalent parent checks are not automatically safe.
+
+AttachmentsControllerTests contains attribute/extension/size reflection tests, not cross-tenant behavioral proof. OwnershipGuardTests similarly checks helper presence. The stronger existing AttachmentConsistencyTests.Another_users_attachment_cannot_be_downloaded_renamed_or_deleted seeds a foreign job/file, clears tracking, checks three NotFound results and verifies the row/file remain.
+
+Fresh targeted execution on the Phase 10 working tree: all 14 AttachmentConsistencyTests passed, zero failures/skips, exit 0, temporary SQLite and synthetic files only. Before execution, git diff between security and Phase 10 branches showed no JobTrackerApi/JobTrackerApi.Tests source difference. Existing Release assembly used --no-build/--no-restore. Evidence published and independently verified on Phase 10 at `db818e5ebd19eeedc05ae58dc3f7a908ce0e713d`, docs/redesign/phase-10/p10-04-evidence/attachment-ownership-and-storage.trx.gz. Uncompressed SHA256 `b589ad1139cb200d9de64b863d65e3304cea0230eda55d89476e5f79347fe84a`.
+
+Result: selected local controller/storage behavior PASSED. Not an authenticated HTTP attack, complete negative list/upload/missing-owner matrix, MariaDB retest, production probe or final scan. Keep those gaps open. No new vulnerability or production exception is asserted; no backend fix was needed for these reviewed paths. Final integrated scan/testing stays deferred until relevant application changes are complete.

docs/security/ENDPOINT_AUTH_MATRIX.csv

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+method,route,source,declared_auth,control_observed,sensitive_asset_or_effect,candidate_test_suite,audit_execution
+GET,/api/attachments/{jobId:int},AttachmentsController.cs:87,local scheme,parent owner-filtered existence check before child listing,attachment metadata,AttachmentConsistencyTests,source reviewed; negative list and HTTP NOT RUN
+GET,/api/attachments/download/{id:int},AttachmentsController.cs:103,local scheme,parent Include ownership filter and managed path checks,attachment bytes,AttachmentConsistencyTests,PASSED foreign-owner controller rejection; HTTP NOT RUN
+PATCH,/api/attachments/{id:int},AttachmentsController.cs:125,local scheme,parent Include ownership filter via shared helper,metadata and AI-use flag,AttachmentConsistencyTests,PASSED foreign-owner controller rejection; HTTP NOT RUN
+DELETE,/api/attachments/{id:int},AttachmentsController.cs:170,local scheme,parent Include ownership filter via shared helper,attachment removal,AttachmentConsistencyTests,PASSED foreign-owner controller rejection with row/file retained; HTTP NOT RUN
+GET,/api/billing/status,BillingController.cs:42,local scheme,method declares local authentication,entitlement status,BillingControllerTests,NOT RUN
+POST,/api/billing/checkout,BillingController.cs:58,local scheme,method declares local authentication; provider mocked only,checkout session,BillingControllerTests,NOT RUN
+POST,/api/billing/portal,BillingController.cs:104,local scheme,method declares local authentication; provider mocked only,billing portal,BillingControllerTests,NOT RUN
+POST,/api/billing/webhook,BillingController.cs:132,AllowAnonymous,signature verification and size limit; full binding audit pending,subscription entitlement,BillingControllerTests,NOT RUN
+PUT,/api/users/{id}/roles,UsersController.cs:142,Admin role at class,privilege transition review pending,account roles,UsersControllerTests,NOT RUN