jobtrackingapp/docs/audits/2026-09-07/validation/b01-completion.md

# B01 — HTTP import destination enforcement

**Completed locally on 2026-09-08.** B01's acceptance criteria pass. The HTTP portion of F11 and the mapped-address bypass V02 are resolved in this working tree. **F11 remains open for B07 (IMAP) and deployment egress assumptions.** B02/B07 were not started. No deployment, migration, dependency upgrade or unrelated application change was made.

Baseline application commit: `7d641edc7bca866ccf06012897ba1d107c07e59f`. The original [boundary observations](evidence/boundary-results.json), [probe source](BoundaryProbes.cs) and audit conclusions remain as historical evidence. This document records the subsequent authorized implementation.

## Files changed

- Application: `JobTrackerApi/Program.cs`, `JobTrackerApi/Services/JobImport/JobImportService.cs`, new `JobTrackerApi/Services/JobImport/JobImportHttpTransport.cs`.
- Tests: `JobTrackerApi.Tests/JobImportServiceTests.cs`, new `JobTrackerApi.Tests/JobImportHttpTransportTests.cs`.
- Status/evidence: `docs/todo/work.md`; this validation directory's `README.md`, `implementation-queue.md`, `evidence.md`, new `b01-completion.md` and new `evidence/b01-test-results.json`.

Original audit documents and TODO changes were already present before B01. They were preserved; the list above identifies this ticket's changes only.

## Root cause and change

The import URL validator treated IPv4-mapped IPv6 as ordinary IPv6. Thus `10.1.2.3` was blocked while `::ffff:10.1.2.3` passed. Separately, hostname preflight and the original HTTP handler performed different resolutions; passing preflight did not constrain the socket destination.

[JobImportHttpTransport](../../../../JobTrackerApi/Services/JobImport/JobImportHttpTransport.cs) contains the shared address classification and a narrow `SocketsHttpHandler.ConnectCallback`. Both [preflight](../../../../JobTrackerApi/Services/JobImport/JobImportService.cs) and connection setup use that classification. The callback resolves once for that connection, rejects empty/mixed/denied answers before dialing, normalizes mapped IPv4, and passes an **IPEndPoint**, never a hostname, to `Socket.ConnectAsync`. Public-address fallback uses only the already checked answer. A new connection repeats validation; an existing pooled TCP connection remains bound to its approved peer.

[Program.cs](../../../../JobTrackerApi/Program.cs) installs this handler only for the existing `jobimport` client. It returns a plain TCP stream; .NET still performs HTTPS, SNI and certificate/hostname verification using the original request URI. There is no permissive certificate callback, hostname rewrite or custom HTTP implementation.

Redirects remain disabled and all 3xx responses remain import failures. Automatic decompression, request headers, parser behavior, the streaming 4,000,000-byte limit and cancellation remain intact. The original client's 100-second timeout is unchanged.

The address policy retains the existing loopback, private, link-local, carrier-grade NAT, benchmark, IPv6 site-local/unique-local/multicast/Teredo exclusions. It also rejects IPv4 multicast/reserved high addresses and scoped IPv6. IPv4-compatible IPv6, well-known NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, `64:ff9b:1::/48`) and 6to4 are rejected explicitly so translation forms do not hide a prohibited IPv4 destination. Ordinary public IPv4, native public IPv6 and public mapped IPv4 remain supported. This is a destination policy, not a complete global IP allocation registry.

**Proxy behavior:** `UseProxy = false` is deliberate for this client. Otherwise a proxy can resolve/connect the origin outside this callback. No other HttpClient or deployment configuration changed. Imports now require direct outbound connectivity; a proxy-only environment must not restore automatic proxy use without an equivalent enforced origin policy. Such an environment was not evidenced in this repository and was not contacted.

## Permanent regression evidence

[JobImportServiceTests](../../../../JobTrackerApi.Tests/JobImportServiceTests.cs) adds 12 literal/encoded-address cases. Running these before changing application code produced **4 failures / 8 passes**: mapped private, link-local, metadata and hexadecimal-mapped forms reached the fake HTTP send. The same tests now all pass.

[JobImportHttpTransportTests](../../../../JobTrackerApi.Tests/JobImportHttpTransportTests.cs) adds 76 cases at the actual .NET HTTP handler/socket boundary:

| Requirement | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Private/local IPv4 and IPv6 | 38 DNS-answer cases cover loopback, RFC1918 boundaries, link-local, ULA/site-local, unspecified, CGNAT, benchmark, multicast/reserved and translation/scoped forms; no dial attempts. |
| Equivalent literal forms | Handler tests reject decimal, hexadecimal, octal, mapped and native IPv6 literals without DNS or dialing; service tests also cover shortened IPv4. |
| Real default dial path | A denied DNS answer cannot reach an inert loopback listener using the production handler without an injected dialer. |
| Resolution failures/mixed answers | Empty, public+private and failed DNS answers fail closed; no fallback to the OS hostname connector. |
| Rebinding window | Preflight returns public, connection resolution returns private/mapped/ULA: no dial. A third hypothetical private answer is never queried after an approved connection-time answer. |
| Public imports | Real HTTP exchange and JobPosting parsing for hostname/literal/public IPv4/native IPv6/mapped IPv4 decisions; original Host/path retained. Public-address socket failure falls back only to another checked address. |
| Connection lifecycle | A second connection on the same handler revalidates DNS and rejects its changed private answer. |
| Proxy escape | A configured proxy trap receives no connection; the approved direct endpoint is used. |
| Redirects | 301/302/303/307/308 pointing to mapped metadata return fetch failure, with exactly one approved dial and no target resolution. |
| TLS identity | Local TLS server observes original-host SNI; trusted matching certificate succeeds; trusted wrong hostname and untrusted matching certificate fail before HTTP data. No certificate-validation bypass. |
| Timeout/cancellation | Short test-only client timeout cancels stalled connection DNS, dial and response headers. Caller cancellation interrupts a stalled streamed response body. Production 100-second timeout is asserted unchanged. |
| Size/decompression | Oversized declared content and gzip expansion over the byte cap fail. The existing chunked-stream test still proves reading stops at the cap plus one sentinel byte. |

All new tests use fake DNS and controlled loopback TCP/TLS fixtures. An internal optional dial delegate records the approved IP then routes only the fixture transport locally; production uses the concrete IP socket method. Tests exercise real .NET HTTP/TLS over that stream and do not claim to have contacted real public/private services. The test CA is trusted only by its test handler, not installed into OS trust. No public DNS, website, metadata endpoint, Stripe or other external service was contacted.

## Commands and exact results

Run from repository root in PowerShell, with existing restored packages:

```powershell
# Before implementation: 12 cases, 4 failed / 8 passed / 0 skipped (expected reproduction).
& C:/Users/Connor/.dotnet/dotnet.exe test JobTrackerApi.Tests/JobTrackerApi.Tests.csproj --configuration Release --no-restore --filter 'FullyQualifiedName~Preview_rejects_equivalent_private_literals_before_http_send' --logger 'trx;LogFileName=b01-before.trx' --results-directory .artifacts/b01 -- xUnit.parallelizeTestCollections=false xUnit.maxParallelThreads=1

# Final focused run: 98 passed / 0 failed / 0 skipped (92 import + 6 existing IMAP literal guards).
& C:/Users/Connor/.dotnet/dotnet.exe test JobTrackerApi.Tests/JobTrackerApi.Tests.csproj --configuration Release --no-restore --filter 'FullyQualifiedName~JobImport|FullyQualifiedName~ImapServiceSsrfGuardTests.ConnectAsync_rejects_internal_and_metadata_hosts' --logger 'trx;LogFileName=b01-focused.trx' --results-directory .artifacts/b01 -- xUnit.parallelizeTestCollections=false xUnit.maxParallelThreads=1

# Broader backend: 840 passed / 0 failed / 0 skipped; one existing DNS-dependent case excluded.
& C:/Users/Connor/.dotnet/dotnet.exe test JobTrackerApi.Tests/JobTrackerApi.Tests.csproj --configuration Release --no-restore --no-build --filter 'FullyQualifiedName!~ImapServiceSsrfGuardTests.ConnectAsync_rejects_unresolvable_host_without_leaking_dns_detail' --logger 'trx;LogFileName=b01-backend.trx' --results-directory .artifacts/b01 -- xUnit.parallelizeTestCollections=false xUnit.maxParallelThreads=1

# API and test project compilation/analyzers: passed, 0 warnings / 0 errors.
& C:/Users/Connor/.dotnet/dotnet.exe build JobTrackerApi.Tests/JobTrackerApi.Tests.csproj --configuration Release --no-restore -warnaserror

git diff --check
```

The excluded existing IMAP test performs real DNS resolution, which this task did not authorize. It is an explicit filter exclusion, not a reported test skip or pass. The broader run includes the focused tests, so their counts must not be added. No frontend files changed; frontend TypeScript/build checks were not rerun. Results/hashes are retained in [b01-test-results.json](evidence/b01-test-results.json); full TRX files remain local under `.artifacts/b01/`.

## Security self-review and residual limitations

- Equivalent mapped representations go through the same IPv4 rule; native IPv6 private/local and known translation forms fail closed. Numeric parsing is delegated to `Uri`/`IPAddress`, with encoded-form regressions.
- The exact validated IP is passed to the socket. There is no DNS lookup between classification and that connect and no unchecked proxy/redirect path. DNS/socket failures do not switch to a permissive hostname transport. Cancellation or connection failure disposes the socket.
- TLS remains the framework's original-host validation. The test-only custom CA policy changes trust for its fixture without disabling hostname checks; production does not set it.
- OS routing, transparent interception, operator-defined NAT64 prefixes and services internally routed under otherwise public IPs are outside an application IP classifier's visibility. Appropriate egress policy remains defense in depth; this change does not certify production routing or every special-use address allocation.
- As before, `HttpClient.Timeout` with `ResponseHeadersRead` covers sending/receiving headers, not the entire body. The body has its byte cap and caller cancellation, but **no independent total-body deadline**. Preflight DNS likewise uses the supplied request cancellation token. No new whole-import duration guarantee is claimed; resource admission/deadline policy can be a separate bounded follow-up.
- Public alternatives are attempted sequentially after socket failures, within the existing client timeout. No parallel connection racing or new network subsystem was added. Linux/container and real external endpoint connectivity were not exercised; local tests ran on Windows/.NET 9.
- Reverting this handler reopens B01. Do not roll it back on an exposed import route without disabling that route or equivalent verified egress enforcement. No database rollback is involved.

**Acceptance verdict: B01 complete.** The reproduced bypass now fails before send, connection-time tests close the validated DNS race, legitimate imports and existing protections pass regression checks, and the wider backend/build gates pass. F11 is only partially remediated because B07/deployment evidence remain outside B01. Stop here; do not begin B02 automatically.